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Chapter One 
Introduction 
“No day shall erase you from the memory of time” – Vergil, Aeneid1 
 
“It was the day everything changed.” While this statement could apply to any 
number of moments in history, for many Americans, hearing this phrase instantly calls 
forth memories of planes hurtling into edifices of American power, the deafening collapse 
of the twin towers, soot and smoke shrouding New York City in darkness, and frantic 
calls to loved ones. The visceral emotion of that day lingers, a crisis of such 
unprecedented devastation that it left an indelible scar on the American psyche. Ten years 
after the anniversary of 9/11, 97% of Americans over the age of eight when the attacks 
occurred can describe exactly where they were and what they were doing when they 
heard the news.2 There are only two other events in American history that have a similar 
scale of recall when measured ten years later: the assassination of President John F. 
Kennedy and the attack on Pearl Harbor.3 Each of these moments deeply affected 
American views and way of life, and each played a key role in shaping national identity.  
It has been nearly twenty years since 9/11 transformed American society, and a 
new generation has grown up in that time and cannot comprehend the America that 
existed before the attacks. When the towers fell, I was only three years old and my 
 
1 Inscribed on the 9/11 Memorial in New York.  
2 Drew Desilver, “More than a Decade Later, 9/11 Attacks Continue to Resonate with Americans,” Pew 
Research Center, May 14, 2014, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/14/more-than-a-decade-
later-911-attacks-continue-to-resonate-with-americans/. 
3 Ibid.  
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younger brother had just turned one. For us, as for many other young people, our 
understanding of 9/11 was amorphous and influenced by a complex mix of meanings 
delivered in a variety of ways. I first remember learning about 9/11 from my parents, who 
recounted their experience of watching the towers fall on live news and the fear and 
shock they felt. I had many other similar experiences growing up, listening to family 
members, teachers, and other adults share their memories of that day and its aftermath. In 
middle school and high school, we often had moments of reflection to honor and 
recognize the tragedy of 9/11 on each anniversary of the attacks. As I got older and 
started to read the news, I was influenced by New York Times and Wall Street Journal 
articles and presidential speeches commemorating the anniversary. However, it was not 
until college that I formally learned about 9/11 and the contentious history of the lead up 
to and the aftermath of the attacks. As a history and government major, I was fascinated 
by how 9/11 and its significant sociopolitical consequences became part of a historical 
narrative of America. 
As the events of September 11th have moved from memory to history, new 
scholarship has reflected critical distance from the emotion and chaos of the immediate 
aftermath. The War on Terror that followed in 9/11’s wake and rising political 
polarization have made the study of 9/11 even more crucial. Much of the scholarship that 
currently exists on 9/11 focuses on fitting the terrorist events into a larger narrative of 
Western manipulation in the Middle East, the failure of the United States’ national 
security system, and the rise of a national security state. While all of these inquiries offer 
valuable insights into contemporary American society, I believe that more scholarship 
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should delve into the ways 9/11 took on symbolic meaning and became a cultural and 
political tool for journalists, politicians, and ordinary Americans in the subsequent years.  
 
Historiography  
Like any good piece of scholarship, this thesis was not created in a vacuum. I 
consulted with several different bodies of historical scholarship to formulate the context 
of my work and guide my analysis. The theoretical frameworks of collective memory and 
trauma provided the analytical foundation of my thesis, while individual sources on 9/11 
enriched my examination of meaning and memory making in the aftermath of the attacks. 
In the following section, I will provide a brief overview of my core theoretical 
frameworks, followed by a historiographical overview of the key texts informing my 
analysis in each chapter.  
 
Collective Memory 
Collective memory emerged as a popular mode of analysis in the early twentieth 
century, founded largely upon the works of Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist and 
follower of Émile Durkheim. Halbwachs’ seminal work, On Collective Memory (Les 
cadres sociaux de la mémoire), argues that memory is a collective enterprise, and is both 
produced by and exists within social frameworks and group identities. Individuals rely on 
society in order to “recall, recognize, and localize their memories,” a process that shapes 
both individual recollection and reaffirms group memory.4 In the individual, the memory 
 
4 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis Closer (University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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of the group is reified and made manifest. From the moment that recollection occurs, 
individuals reproduce a collective perception that can only be processed within frames of 
the group thought, discourse, and identity.5 Discourse connects within a single framework 
of ideas personal thoughts, as well as those of the group. Through the negotiation of 
memory, a collective, social framework shapes the meaning and significance of past 
events and “binds our most intimate remembrances to each other.”6 Halbwachs argues 
that recent memories, and memories of a distant past, are not bound together because they 
occurred contiguously in time, but because “they are part of a totality of thoughts 
common to a group, the group of people with whom we have a relation at this moment, or 
with whom we have had a relation on the preceding day or days.”7 Thus, in remembering 
the past, individuals integrate their memory of events into the perspective of the group, a 
process that requires individuals to confront group interests and standards for reflection. 
Halbwachs argues that collective memories of the past are not stagnant, but 
constantly undergoing reconstruction on the basis of present-day concerns.8 Collective 
frameworks of memory are tools that enable individuals to “reconstruct an image of the 
past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society.”9 
Thus, when an event occurs that profoundly affects a group’s identity, there are 
preexisting systems of beliefs that provide the interpretative framework to understand the 
event and encode it in collective memory. Every group relies on a set of tools for 
interpretation: signs, symbols, practices, monuments, museums, customs, stenotype 
 
5 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 62.  
6 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory. 53.  
7 Halbwachs. 52.  
8 Halbwachs. 40.  
9 Ibid.  
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images, and language.10 These tools provide narrative elements essential to structuring 
and assigning meaning to events. This is essential, because without an understanding and 
belief in a collective past, it is impossible for group identities to remain intact.11 
Since Halbwachs initial ground-breaking work, a range of scholars from a variety 
of different disciplines have expanded upon and sharpened the concept of collective 
memory. Yadin Dudai, a renowned neurobiologist, argues that the term “collective 
memory” is comprised of three different components: a body of knowledge, an attribute, 
and a process.12 In this thesis, I will focus on the last component, the process, which can 
also be called the act of collective remembering. The process of collective remembering 
is best described as the “continual evolution of understanding between the individual and 
the group, as individuals may influence and change the collective memory of the 
group.”13 The practice of collective remembering challenges the notion of static base of 
facts and instead illustrates the way people and societies must constantly reconstructs 
representations of the past.  
Collective memory inevitably focusses on the construction of identity. 
Remembering becomes a mode for determining what it means to be part of the group. Yet 
where history seeks to be objective and recognize the complex multiplicity of 
perspectives, collective memory is far more motivated by contemporary social and 
political concerns. The historian Peter Novick views collective remembering as one-
 
10 Amos Funkenstein, “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness,” History and Memory 1, no. 1 
(1989): 5–26. 
11 Funkenstein. 
12 Yadin Dudai, Memory from A to Z: Keywords, Concepts and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
13 James Wertsch and Henry Roediger, “Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical 
Approaches,” Memory (Hove, England) 16 (May 1, 2008): 318–26, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701801434. 
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dimensional, rooted in “a single, committed perspective” that “reduces events to mythic 
archetypes.”14 As memories become interwoven with identity, narrative constructions of 
an event may ignore or distort certain facts in order to serve a group’s present needs.15 
Thus, collective remembering occurs simultaneously with collective forgetting. Marita 
Sturken captured this notion, writing, “The desire for narrative closure… forces upon 
historical events the limits of narrative form and enables forgetting.”16 This is particularly 
true in the case of national memory, where national narratives structure collective 
memory and impose ‘‘a coherent ordering of events along a strict narrative line serving as 
an intellectual and emotional backbone of national identity.’’17 In the creation of national 
narratives, elites lead the charge in synthesizing events, characters, and motives to 
produce a clear picture of the past. Elites rely on existing narrative elements, deeply 
embedded in a nation’s culture and langue, to give coherent meaning to complex events. 
This process is essential in the context of traumatic events, which play an integral role in 
group identity and also challenge existing frames of meaning.  
 
Collective Trauma  
Throughout history, the dramatic restructuring of group identity has often been 
triggered by traumatic events. From the early persecution of Jews to the horrific loses of 
 
14 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, First Mariner Books Edition 2000 (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1999), https://www.amazon.com/Holocaust-American-Life-Peter-
Novick/dp/0618082328. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Marita Sturken, Tourists of History: Memory, Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma City to Ground 
Zero (Duke University Press, 2007). 
17 Jan Assmann, “Cultural Memories and National Narratives: With Some Relation to the Case of Georgia,” 
Caucasus Context 3, no. 1 (n.d.): 40–43. 
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the Holocaust, from the creation of the state of Israel and the Arab losses in the six-day 
war, trauma often serves as a catalyst, one that binds a group together based on shared 
experience. In “Notes on Trauma and Community,” Kai Erikson argues that traumatic 
events create a sense of community and identity, where “shared experience becomes 
almost like a common culture, a source of kinship.”18 In fact, most groups have some 
“myth or origin,” which begin with some sort of founding trauma, an common experience 
of suffering and perseverance that forged a collective identity.19 Through the use of 
narratives about trauma, elites are able to nationalize tragedy and encode the event in the 
group’s history and identity.20 The state-led process of recognizing and identifying with 
victims is a core component of embedding a tragedy into a national consciousness and 
identity. Dominic LaCapra argues that entrenching trauma in a frame of historical loss is 
a rhetorical device that allows the “appropriation of particular traumas by those who did 
not experience them, typically in a movement of identity formation that makes invidious 
and ideological use of traumatic series of events in foundational ways or as symbolic 
capital.”21 The appropriation of a traumatic event into the discourse on national identity is 
the foundational lens through which I will analyze the memory-creation in the wake of 
9/11.  
In Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma, Jeffery Alexander defines cultural 
trauma as a moment where “members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a 
 
18 Kai Erikson, “Notes on Trauma and Community,” American Imago, Psychoanalysis, Culture, and 
Trauma: II, 48, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 455–72. 
19 Dominick LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss,” Critical Inquiry 25, no. 4 (July 1999): 696–727, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/448943. 
20 Sven Cvek, Towering Figures: Reading the 9/11 Archive. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011). 
21 LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss.” 
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horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking 
their memories forever, and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable 
ways.”22 The experience of a shared trauma catalyzes a sense of collective identity and 
guides group mentality. A traumatic event occurs when a shared context abruptly shifts in 
an unforeseen and unwelcome way.23 The reconstitution of a collective identity on the 
basis of a shared trauma is fundamental to the analysis of 9/11 and the symbolic meaning 
the event now holds. Alexander argues that “trauma is not something naturally existing; it 
is something constructed by society.” As a result, there can be some distance between the 
factual accounting of the event and the popular representations of that event. The process 
of symbolically characterizing an event allows members of a collective to make “’claims’ 
about the shape of social reality, its causes, and the responsibilities for action such causes 
imply.”24 These claims feed into a larger national narrative, where the public and the state 
must navigate demands for “emotional, institutional, and symbolic reparation and 
reconstitution.”25  
Trauma plays a formative role in creating a clear sense of a collective, an us-
versus-them dichotomy, that provides structure to memory and fosters a feeling on an 
“imagined community.” The terrorist attacks of 9/11, thus, had all the ingredients to 
constitute a cultural trauma. In the collection Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, 
 
22 Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma,” in Cultural Trauma and Collective 
Identity, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2004), 1–30, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp9nb.4. 
23 Alexander et al. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
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several scholars explore the traumatic nature of 9/11.26  In my analysis, I focused on the 
following: the initial reaction of shock and disbelief, the widespread displays of 
collective mourning, and the perception that the attacks would leave a scar on the psyche 
of the nation. In my chapter on commemorations, I examine post-9/11 sentiments, 
particularly the fear that “2001 was a scarred or ruined year, that the world must be 
regarded as having a pre-September 11 and post-September 11 reality, that the events 
would not only never be forgotten but also that we would never be able to forget them.”27 
These feelings were often expressed by both broadcast news stations and government 
officials who immediately took up the call to arms and set about attributing meaning to 
9/11, so that the public would know what exactly is meant to never be forgotten. In 
addition to the necessitated “unforgettability” of 9/11, there was sense that Americans had 
a responsibility to the dead. This responsibility primarily manifested in two ways: 
protecting the memory of 9/11 in a national memorial and standing united in War on 
Terror. In the following chapters, I analyze how debates between state officials and the 
victims’ family members demonstrate the way the dead were used to legitimize specific 
memories and interpretations of 9/11.  
The final three points made by the authors in Cultural Trauma and Collective 
Identity were particularly essential in guiding my analysis of memory-creation throughout 
the chapters of my thesis. Bernhard Giesen argued that trauma produces deliberative 
efforts to remember an event collectively, through commemorative ceremonies, public 
 
26The collection, written and compiled only four months after the attacks, is inherently a product of the 
crisis in which it was written. Yet in its proximity to the its subject, the collection provides additionally 
insight into how 9/11 was viewed soon after the tragedy took place. Throughout the collection, the scholars 
argue that 9/11 constituted a cultural trauma for many reasons, summarized in eight points. 
27 Alexander et al., “Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma.” Epilogue.  
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observation of anniversaries, and the erection of monuments.28 Furthermore, Giesen 
describes how “memory supports or even creates an assumption of stability, permanence, 
and continuity” that is established through the preservation of past traumas or triumphs.29 
Thus, collectives seek to assign meaning and then memorialize that meaning in order to 
protect and project a sense of national identity. I use this framework to examine why 
efforts to commemorate 9/11 began so soon after the attacks. Additionally, several of the 
authors in the collection wrote about the necessity of sustained public interest in the 
remembering process, often involving “contestations among politically interested groups 
over how the remembering should take place.”30 Finally, Alexander, Giesen, and Smelser 
argue that at the heart of collective trauma is the sense that American identity had been 
fundamentally altered by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  
 
Media Coverage of September 11th, 2001: The Formative Role of Cable News in 9/11 
Memory  
In my chapter on the ways cable news networks covered and framed the events of 
September 11th, I relied on Brian Monahan’s study of 9/11 as a public drama to guide my 
analysis of how and why certain media narratives emerged. In The Shock of the News: 
Media coverage and the Making of 9/11, Brian Monahan demonstrates how cable news 
networks privilege events that are shocking and emotionally captivating.31 Public dramas 
 
28 Ibid.  
29 Bernhard Giesen and Jeffrey C. Alexander, “The Trauma of Perpetrators: The Holocaust as the 
Traumatic Reference of German National Identity,” in Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, 1st ed. 
(University of California Press, 2004), 112–54, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp9nb.7. 
30 Alexander, “Conclusion,” Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. 
31 Brian A. Monahan, “Introduction: Understanding Public Drama,” in The Shock of the News, Media 
Coverage and the Making of 9/11 (NYU Press, 2010), 3–17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qgd3m.5. 
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are then constructed out of emotionally charged news elements and molded into a 
coherent narrative.32 Using this framework, I argue that the chaos and confusion depicted 
on air in the first twelve hours necessitate a narrative that could make sense of the attacks 
and calm the American people. To further this argument, I drew upon a collection of 
articles in Media Representations of September 1133 and used their expanded definition of 
a public drama to demonstrate how news outlets at the outset of the crisis transformed 
9/11 into an “ideological tour de force.” I use their analysis of different forms of media 
representation to examine why certain interpretations and narratives were preferred overs 
others, and how that influenced public consumption and understanding of the terrorist 
attacks.  
 
Official Responses to 9/11: The Legacy of September 11th in Presidential Speeches 
In my chapter on official responses to 9/11, I drew on scholarship about the 
inaugural genre and the emergence of the “War on Terror” rhetoric to guide my analysis 
of how presidential discourse ascribed a national meaning to the attacks. Using Mike 
Milford’s study on “National Identity, Crisis, and the Inaugural Genre: George W. Bush 
and 9/11,” I analyzed why presidential speeches post-9/11 emphasized universal 
American values as a way to promote national identity. As Milford demonstrates in his 
essay, the presidential speeches relied on allusions to freedom and bravery as a way to 
assuage the feelings of displacement, confusion, and fear that the physical attacks 
engendered. Another component of my analysis emerged from Stuart Croft’s examination 
 
32 Ibid.  
33 Also referred to as a media spectacle.  
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of the “War on Terror” rhetoric in his book Culture, Crisis, and America’s War on Terror. 
Croft’s book discusses the emergence of the “War on Terror” discourse and the way it 
produced through the interplay of government officials and news networks. Croft 
contextualizes his analysis through the theory of discourse, which argues that “a 
discourse is produced by government, reproduced and amplified by social institutions.”34 
Drawing upon this framework, I argue that 9/11 narratives are produced through the 
debates on collective memory held by a mix of social and political institutions. Once 
events have taken on a particular connotation, politicians are then able to wield its 
symbolic power to achieve political ends. 
 
Commemorating 9/11: Enshrining Memory in the National 9/11 Memorial and 
Museum  
Prior studies of collective memory and 9/11 have fallen into a variety of niche 
fields, with the largest body of scholarship centered on collective memory and 
commemoration. The link between the two is clear; the process of memorializing the 
dead provides an arena for members of a society to reify memory and meaning and 
embed particular connotations in the physical landscape. These fixed and visible sites in 
return legitimize the conception of a common memory, one that is shared only by “the 
people who possessed and rallied around such a memory.”  Furthermore, commemorative 
sites, rooted in a particular time and space, are intended to provide many citizens with a 
sense of shared national identity regardless of individual differences of class, region, 
 
34 Ibid.  
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gender, or race.35 Ideas, more than any particular victory or person, are integral in 
memorials and monuments. It is a discursive and deliberative process, one that both relies 
on and challenges traditional power dynamics between state and citizen. State officials, as 
John Bodnar writes, rely on commemoration as a way of promoting “social unity, the 
continuity of existing institutions, and loyalty to the status quo.”36 In doing so, they 
advocate for interpretations of the past and present that “reduce the power of competing 
interests that appear to threaten the attainment of their goals.”37 Thus, public memorials 
have two very important roles. First, they serve to preserve memory by permanently 
embedding significant events into the physical landscape.38 Second, public memorials 
legitimize particular national narratives and collectives over others.39 However, this 
common narrative, which may appear cohesive, is often the product of intense and 
protracted battles over meaning fought between state officials and different popular 
interest groups.  
Contestations over meaning in the memorial are one of the primary avenues of 
collective remembering, which Yadin Dudai discussed. In Remembering 9/11: Memorials 
and Cultural Memory, Erika Doss explains how memorials serve as teaching tools that 
illustrate “how, and why, cultural memory is created, and how it shapes local and national 
identity.”40 The construction of every memorial is motivated by a complex mix of 
 
35 John R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Reprint edition (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
36 Gillis. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Gillis, 143.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Erika Doss, “Remembering 9/11: Memorials and Cultural Memory,” OAH Magazine of History 25, no. 3 
(July 2011): 27–30, https://doi.org/10.1093/oahmag/oar018. 
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individual and social causes and concerns, which result in widespread debates over “self-
definition, national purpose, and the politics of representation.”41 This is especially true 
in the case of the 9/11 Memorial and Museum, where the process of commemoration 
served as a vehicle for discussions on the ownership of the dead – both the physical 
bodies and the symbolic meaning they hold.   
Museums, while also a key component of the commemorative process, have a 
very different purpose and structure in comparison to a memorial. In the context of 
commemorative site, James Young considers the museum to be part of an “interdependent 
whole, in which neither history nor memory can stand without the other.”42 The purpose 
of commemoration is to both memorialize and inform, to infuse memory into history, so 
that each directive shapes the other.43 Thus, the museum must provide the historical 
context that gives weight to the emotional experience of the memorial.  
 
Abstract 
From the oval office to town halls, from the television screen to the archive, 
Americans sought to define 9/11 and its role in American national identity and history. 
This thesis will focus on the ways collective memory regarding 9/11 was established, the 
role of elites in memory initiatives that ingrained 9/11 in American national identity, and 
how collective memory can be used as a political or cultural tool to create national unity. 
 
41 Ibid.  
42 James E. Young, “Memory and the Monument after 9/11,” in The Future of Memory, ed. Richard 
Crownshaw, Jane Kilby, and Antony Rowland, NED-New edition, 1 (Berghahn Books, 2010), 77–92, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qd7gv.10. 
43 Ibid.  
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Throughout this thesis, I will rely on the theoretical frameworks of collective trauma and 
collective memory to inform and guide my examination. The framework of collective 
memory lays the foundation for understanding how national memory was built in the 
days, weeks, and months after 9/11, while the frame of collective trauma illustrates how a 
“founding trauma” can forge national identity. In the first two chapters of the thesis, I will 
look at how elites, particularly television news journalists and government officials, 
shaped popular understandings of 9/11 and repurposed older cultural discourses to give 
the attacks larger symbolic meaning. In the final chapter, I will examine the process of 
commemoration in New York’s 9/11 Memorial and Museum, and study how 
memorializing the dead provided an arena where individuals, the public, and elites 
negotiated and enshrined meaning.  
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Chapter Two 
Media Coverage of September 11th, 2001: The Formative Role of Cable 
News in 9/11 Memory 
 
“For those of you just joining us, let me try to put as many of these pieces 
together as I can, as we stand here in New York.” At 11:15 am EDT on September 11th, 
2001, CNN’s new anchor, Aaron Brown, recounted the shocking timeline of events that 
had riveted the nation for the past two and a half hours. This update was one of the many 
hundred that occurred throughout the day, monopolizing the screens of domestic and 
global audiences as the tragedy of the terrorist attacks unfolded. News stations around the 
world interrupted regular broadcasting with constant coverage of the attacks, eyewitness 
accounts, interviews with officials, updates on the rescue efforts, and speculations. All of 
the audio was accompanied by visceral, gut-wrenching imagery – of the second plane 
hitting the South tower, of billowing smoke at the crash sites in New York and 
Washington D.C., of the towers collapsing into mushroom clouds of debris, of people 
panicking and running in the streets. Sirens could be heard in the background of 
correspondents on the ground, as well as frantic phone calls being made as new reports 
came in. Nearly all of the main U.S. media outlets experienced some sort of technical 
difficulties – video fritzing, calls cutting out – which heightened the sense of chaos and 
confusion that characterized the day. For millions around the world, it was through the 
television screen that they learned about and experienced the events of 9/11. Thus, it was 
also through the lens of the media that much of the memory and meaning of 9/11 was 
initially constructed.  
 21 
In this chapter, I will detail the ways in which the media created and fed into the 
dominant narrative and cultural understandings of 9/11 and how it embedded that 
narrative into American collective memory. I will focus first on how the media 
established the significance of the attacks, highlighting the rhetoric that was used and 
media slogans that were developed. Next, I will illustrate how the attacks were construed 
as a collective trauma, which played an important role in ingraining the attacks in a new 
reality and collective identity. Subsequently, I will delve into the construction of the 
attacks as an “act of war,” relying on media scholars’ analysis of the first twelve hours of 
coverage. Lastly, I will explore how cable news coverage of 9/11 fostered a sense of 
national unity rarely present in the United States.44 
 
Contextualizing Coverage: An Overview of Cable News Networks  
In American society, the role of the press has evolved as media commercialized 
and new technologies emerged. The modern national media landscape began to take 
shape in the 19th century with the rise of successful national magazines and advertising-
based radio and television broadcasting.45 As news reached broader audiences with the 
radio and the television, concerns about fascism and propaganda prompted discussions on 
the trustworthiness of the media. In the 1920s, political commentator Walter Lippmann 
published a well-known piece warning that “opinion can be manufactured,” and as result, 
 
44 For the purposes of this thesis, I will primarily be relying on recorded footage from CNN, ABC, and 
CBS, though it is important to note that the television coverage of 9/11 was remarkable for its homogenous 
representation and use of common images, symbols, and rhetoric. 
45 “Media and Democracy: Our American History,” The Aspen Institute, accessed May 4, 2020, 
https://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/Knight-Commission-TMD/2019/report/details/0285/Knight-
Commission. 
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journalistic standards of objectivity were required. Out of these concerns, federal laws 
were implemented in the 1940s and 1950s that delineated certain standards of objectivity 
and prevented the consolidation of media coverage under single companies.46 
 Unlike journalists, broadcasters needed government permission to use 
public airways and were subject to more restrictions on what could be presented. From 
1949 to 1987, broadcasters were regulated by the Fairness Doctrine, which required 
stations to “present controversial issues of public importance” and to do so in a manner 
that was “honest, equitable, and balanced.”47 The policy effectively limited the ability of 
news outlets to promote a political viewpoint; thus, the reversal of this doctrine in 1987 
drastically altered the media landscape that would define the news coverage of 9/11.  
Another major shift that occurred in the 1980s was led by the Reagan 
administration, which passed new laws easing restrictions on media conglomerates. 
Beginning in 1981, the Reagan administration chipped away at regulations preserving the 
objective, public service responsibility of the news outlets. The Clinton administration 
later took a sledgehammer to the bedrock of media regulations. In 1996, President 
Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act, the first major overhaul of 
telecommunications law in over sixty years. The new law eradicated the 40-station 
ownership cap and allowed for cross-ownership of broadcast stations and 
telecommunications, unleashing a wave of consolidations that left the media landscape 
dominated by a few giants.48 The trend towards media conglomeration over the past thirty 
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years is clear. In 1983, 50 corporations predominantly controlled the American media, but 
by 1992, that number had dropped by half.49 By 2000, a mere six corporations50 
dominated 90% of the media in America and 70% of cable viewership. 51The rise of 
massive media conglomerations over the past thirty years inspired fears that the news 
media would no longer serve in its role as watchdog and offer diverse, dissenting 
opinions.52 These concerns have only increased as a result of the cable news networks’ 
coverage of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Therefore, the consolidation of American 
news networks under a few corporations helps explain the remarkable singularity of 
opinions in the coverage of 9/11.  
While the shifting media landscape of the 1980s and 1990s laid the foundation for 
how cable news channels responded to 9/11, news coverage of the First Gulf War 
permanently altered the way wars and crises are covered. Due to restrictions on oversees 
ground deployment of war correspondents, a result of Vietnam era policy, CNN was the 
only outlet broadcasting from inside Iraq when the bombing began on January 17, 1991. 
While other networks relied heavily on information and imagery provided by the 
government, CNN was in the unique position to cover events live. CNN’s 24-hour 
coverage was a milestone in television news that permanently shaped the way crises are 
covered. CNN’s coverage of the First Gulf War challenged the traditional model of a 
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morning-evening news cycle and instead introduced a new era of nonstop, constantly 
updating flow of information.53 Peter Arnett, CNN’s war correspondent in Baghdad and 
likely the most famous reporter of the Gulf War, described the impact of the media’s 
coverage: “For the first time in media history, an event is covered as it unfolds, anywhere 
in the world… The critics would argue that the traditional gatekeeper role of journalists 
— to sift through information and present what seems valid in an accurate way — has 
disappeared with this live coverage.”54 The introduction of live coverage irrevocably 
changed the framework it which news was delivered. After the Gulf War, live coverage 
transformed the news into a constant stream of information that was often coupled with 
visceral, disturbing images of the crisis. Viewers increasingly relied on anchors to 
contextualize and interpret the omnipresent images on their screens. In an analysis on the 
media and the First Gulf War, written a few months after the war had concluded, Stewart 
Purvis wrote, “People will argue about which was the first ‘television war’… I have no 
doubt that the Gulf was the first war in which the full potential of satellite technology was 
used, bringing with it new technical and ethical challenges for broadcasters.”55 Many of 
the anchors who covered the First Gulf War were the same as those covering the 
September 11th attacks. ABC’s host Peter Jennings, CBS’s host Dan Rather, and NBC’s 
host Tom Brokaw were all veteran reporters who led their network’s coverage of both 
crises. Media coverage of the First Gulf War, fought only a decade before 9/11, provided 
networks with a template on how to respond to a crisis like 9/11.  
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Thus, the new era of the ‘television war’ fundamentally shaped the way cable 
news networks responded to and interpreted the crisis of the September 11th terrorist 
attacks. In The Shock of the News: Media coverage and the Making of 9/11, Brian 
Monahan demonstrates how cable news networks are now guided by a mentality shaped 
by profit-maximization and the need to the first to break a story in a highly competitive 
24-7 news cycle. As a result, the entrainment ethos, which privileges events that are 
shocking and emotionally captivating, has come to replace traditional journalistic norms 
of objectivity, investigation, and education.56 Monahan argues that news networks 
processed and packaged the terrorist attacks through a frame of “public drama.” 
According to Monahan, public dramas are constructed out of emotionally charged news 
elements and then molded into a narrative, with a cast of characters, dynamic plot, and 
enthralling setting.57 In this way, 9/11 was “transformed into a morality tale centered on 
patriotism, victimization, and heroes.”58 In the frame of the public drama, collective 
trauma is communicated and reinforced through the use of visceral images and stories 
that depict pain and suffering. Furthermore, as cable news outlets present images of 
chaos, confusion, and trauma, reporters are pressured to produce a narrative that will 
contextualize the images on the screen. Thus, the framework of 9/11 as a public drama 
enhances my analysis of how news networks influenced the construction of memory and 
meaning after 9/11.  
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An Accident?: The Initial Coverage of the Plane Crashes  
Unfolding through live footage on screens around the world, 9/11 occurred 
primarily as a media event, referred to by scholars as a “spectacle of terror.”59 Although 
chaos and confusion reigned in the coverage of the first 12 hours of the attacks, a 
dominant discourse emerged that there was a clear America “before” and “after” the 
events of September 11th. By the end of the day, most cable news networks clearly 
depicted the terrorist attacks as a turning point in American history, and event that 
fractured traditional notions of national identity and restructured what it meant to be 
American. Furthermore, The events of 9/11 were perceived as such a “moral shock,” 
previous meanings and ways of understanding the world no longer worked.60 In broadcast 
news there is regular programing, breaking news, and news events that are so significant, 
all commercial breaks and unrelated news are suspended to dedicate the full resources of 
media institutions to the coverage of a single event. That is what happened, starting at 
8:46 am, September 11th, 2001. In this context, the entire of focus the media, and thus the 
entirely of the public who watches or reads the news, was focused on a single unfolding 
event. 
The significance of what had happened became apparent in stages, as anchors 
compiled more information and the destruction continued to unfold. CNN was the first 
network to break the news of a plane flying into and hitting the North Tower at 8:49am 
EDT, followed by CNBC at 8:50am, MSNBC at 8:52am, and Fox News Channel at 
8:54am. CNN opened their coverage with the statement,  
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This just in. You are looking at an obviously very disturbing live 
shot there, that is the World Trade Center, and we have unconfirmed 
reports this morning that a plane has crashed into one of the towers of the 
World Trade Center. CNN Center right not is just beginning to work on 
this story, obviously calling our sources and trying to figure out exactly 
what happened, but clearly something relatively devastating is happening 
this morning.61  
 
CNN quickly got on the air with eyewitnesses, in particular Shawn Murtaugh the 
VP of Finance, who confirmed that he had observed a small commercial jet hit the side of 
North tower.62 Over the next hour, CNN interviewed several other people, trying to 
deduce whether the plane crash could have an accident. In one interview, an expert 
explained that there were no normal flight patterns around downtown Manhattan and that 
the weather could not have been a factor causing the crash. In was clear in CNN’s initial 
coverage that they were approaching the crash as possible accident and were hesitant to 
broach the possibility of terrorism. The likely reasons for this are twofold. First, CNN 
had a journalistic obligation to confirm reports before making claims and to remain 
objective and calm in the face of disaster. Second, if the plane crash was a result of 
terrorism, it would have already been the largest and most devastating terrorist attack in 
American history. The fear that the crash was purposeful, and the resulting implications 
of that type of attack, made CNN and other networks like ABC and CBS hesitant to 
immediately bring up the idea of terrorism. That being said, CNN began to consider the 
possibility right before the second plane hit, illustrated by an allusion a CNN 
commentator made to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.63  
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Up until the second plane hit the South Tower, there was still speculation on 
whether the first plane crash could have been an accident. However, at 9:02am EDT 
viewers on CNN saw a second plane crash into the South Tower of the World Trade 
Center. Since 8:48am, when the first plane crashed into the North Tower, CNN had 
constant live footage of the two towers on the screen while eyewitnesses described the 
scene around the base of the towers. CNN did not immediately rollback the video (neither 
did ABC or CBS), so the anchors initially thought it was an explosion of the fuselage 
from the first plane that was still embedded in the North Tower. Soon after, the CNN 
anchor interrupted the eyewitness to play back the video, stating, “Now, one of our 
producers said perhaps a second plane was involved, and let's not even speculate to the 
point, but at least put it out there that perhaps that may have happened.”64 Within five 
minutes of the second plane hitting the South Tower, CNN had confirmed the presence of 
the plane and showed the impact in a clear, riveting, and utterly horrific close shot. This 
video would be replayed eight times in the twenty minutes after the attack, and trend that 
continued throughout the day and served to retraumatize viewers.  
As the video was replayed, speculation about a navigational accident seemed 
comically unlikely, and anchors started to describe the plane crashes as deliberate and 
purposeful attacks, although they did not refer to it as a terrorist attack until President 
Bush’s speech.65 ABC’s host Peter Jennings, who in general had more emotionally 
charged rhetoric in his coverage of the events, quickly followed the second plane crash 
with the statement: “This looks like it is some sort of concerted effort to attack the World 
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Trade Center that is underway.”66 Jennings’ comment created a sense of more to come, a 
slightly different sentiment from CNN and CBS’s coverage of the attack, which was more 
cautious and hesitant to jump to conclusions. That being said, the balance of uncertainty, 
desire to be the first to report a critical update, and journalistic integrity was a key 
calculous for all of the news sites. Jennings’ comment turned out to fall short of the full 
scale of the attack underway. Around 9:40 am EDT, reports began to filter in about a fire 
at the Pentagon. Soon after, statements came in that symbols of American power all 
across the nation were being evacuated, including the White House, Treasury, State 
Department, embassies, Sears Tower, all in addition to evacuation efforts already 
underway at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Thus, the terrorist attacks were 
not merely localized events but a cause of national chaos and paralysis.  
 
So What Does This Mean?: Networks Seek to Interpret the Terrorist Attacks  
Once it became clear that planes were being deliberately highjacked and used in a 
concerted terrorist attack on the United States, Americans turned to their television 
stations to get information and answers. By the evening of September 11, 2001, around 
80 million people were watching prime-time coverage of that morning’s attacks.67 The 
most watched broadcast was NBC's Tuesday night coverage of the terrorist hijackings, 
averaging more than 22 million viewers from 8 to 11. ABC News averaged 17.6 million, 
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CBS News 14.4 million, and Fox averaged 5.6 million.68 Furthermore, Nielsen Media 
Research found that in the month of September, an average of over 4.5 million viewers 
watch CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News’s Prime Time coverage (2.75x the level of 
viewership in August, 2001).69 The unprecedented viewership statistics for Prime Time 
coverage demonstrate the important role cable news networks played in distributing 
information and meaning regarding 9/11.   
As the primary avenue of information sharing in a time of crisis and the bridge 
between state officials and the public, the media was essential for reinforcing symbols of 
collective American identity. The lasting changes of the First Gulf War on the way 
networks covered crises had a massive impact on the way 9/11 was witnessed by viewers. 
In the years prior to the Gulf War, there were two news segments – one in the morning 
and one in the evening. Each news cycle was designed to synthesize the important 
information of the day into highlight reels easily consumed by audiences. After the Gulf 
War, however, live coverage transformed the news into a constant stream of information 
that was often coupled with visceral, disturbing images of the crisis. Viewers relied 
heavily on anchors to contextualize and interpret the omnipresent images on their 
screens. In a crisis like 9/11, an event that seemed utterly incomprehensible and 
unimaginable, Americans looked to their respected network hosts to set the tone and 
define the terms. In this section, I will examine how the news networks embedded 9/11 in 
a larger historical context and also exacerbated and emphasized the collective trauma of 
the event.  
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The unwavering media emphasis on the attack immediately established its 
significance, but journalists went further by directly integrating the attacks into a larger 
historical and national context. The media, coupled with government officials, 
immediately situated 9/11 within the larger context of American history, and thus, 
national identity. In coverage on September 11th and in ensuing weeks, 9/11 was 
described by print and broadcast media as a watershed moment and a “fundamental 
reconfiguring of what it meant to be a citizen of the United States.”70 The terrorists 
attacks shattered American innocence and inducted the country into a global history of 
violence and insecurity, one that America had been remarkably exempt from in its short 
existence.71 The interpretation of the attacks as a profound historical moment is 
illustrated in the rhetoric used by the main anchormen on CNN, ABC, and CBS in the 
wake of the attacks, particularly in the first twelve hours of coverage. In the article 
““America under Attack”: CNN’s Verbal and Visual Framing of September 11,” Amy 
Reynolds and Brooke Barnett conducted a qualitative study of the first twelve hours of 
CNN’s coverage of the attacks and found that journalists and sources provided viewers 
with strong verbal clues about the enormity of the event. They made repeated references 
to God, the need for prayer and salvation, and often repeated strategic keywords over and 
over, including: “horrific,” “unbelievable,” “extraordinary,” “freedom,” “justice,” and 
“liberty.” The keywords, coupled with emotional adages from anchors and witness, 
established 9/11 as a national tragedy like no other.  
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Furthermore, government officials that CNN anchors interviewed powerfully 
reinforced this notion and gave the attacks historical meaning and context. This has not 
always been the case. CNN war correspondent Peter Arnett described how during the 
First Gulf War, “you had Stormin' Norman having a major influence on what Americans 
were thinking. But you also had Saddam Hussein on CNN for an hour and a half, giving 
his version of what was happening, and all manner of other people on many other 
networks contributing to the flow of information.”72 The initial coverage of 9/11, 
however, was remarkable for the way that journalists and politicians converged on a 
single meaning. News networks relied heavily on government sources and deferred to 
politicians when it came to interpreting meaning behind the attacks. An oft citied source 
on many of the networks, New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani described the attacks as 
“one of the most heinous acts, certainly in world history.”73 U.S. Attorney General John 
Ashcroft reinforced Giuliani’s sentiment, stating that “Today, America has experienced 
one of the greatest tragedies ever witnessed on our soil. These heinous acts of violence 
are an assault on the security of our nation. They are an assault on the security and 
freedom on every American citizen.”74 Throughout the day reporters and their sources 
relied on keywords such as “America” (instead of the United States or the U.S.), 
“freedom,” “justice,” “liberty,” and visual graphics, such as the flag. Additionally, media 
outlets employed a variety of slogans, captions, and graphics to brand the coverage of 
9/11 and its aftermath. ABC used the slogans “America Attacked,” “A Nation United,” 
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CBS used the phrase “Attack on America,” and CNN’s coverage branded as “America 
under Attack.” The New York Times specials that came out in the aftermath of the attacks 
were titled “A Nation Challenged,” Day of Terror,” and “Portraits of Grief.” These verbal 
and visual references served to reinforce American cultural values and foster a sense of 
national camaraderie that was integral for framing the event as a national turning point.  
In addition to framing 9/11 as a historic moment, the media played an essential 
role in constructing the attacks as a national trauma, rather than a personal tragedy 
limited to the victims. As Jeffery Alexander’s theory of cultural trauma suggests, 
collective trauma occurs when “members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected 
to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, 
marking their memories forever, and changing their future identity in fundamental and 
irrevocable ways.”75 When a traumatic event occurs, there is an acute need for 
representation and interpretation of the event. Representatives of the collective are then 
tasked with broadcasting symbolic depictions, which Alexander refers to as “claims” that 
illustrate “the shape of social reality, its causes, and the responsibilities for action such 
causes imply.”76 The claims in turn provide the basis for a feeling of collective trauma, a 
sense that the values and security that Americans hold so dear have been fundamentally 
damaged by terrorist attacks.   
The media’s construction of 9/11 as a “pervasive and universal trauma” was made 
possible by the monopolization of attention, discourse, and coverage of the attack. David 
Holloway argues that broadcast networks “opened 9/11 to universal participation by 
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national and global audiences, even those very remote from New York or Washington.”77 
By collapsing the traditional distinctions between those who physically experienced the 
trauma and those who witnessed it, 9/11 was formed as a collective trauma. Holloway 
contends that “When the World Trade Center towers collapsed, the scale of the audience 
facilitated by twenty-first-century mass media meant that the event was ‘real’ on the day 
for millions of Americans, as well as countless billions around the world.”78 Viewers 
watched in horror with the anchors on television as the second plane crashed into the 
South Tower, and as the towers collapsed a little over an hour later. The shock, confusion, 
chaos of the moment unfolded on the screen where tragedy took place in real time, and 
then over and over as clips were replayed throughout the day. This sentiment was 
captured by exchange on ABC between the host Peter Jennings and a correspondent, Don 
Dahler, who was at the scene when the first tower collapsed:  
Jennings: “Let’s go to the Trade Center again because John, we now have, what 
do we have? We don’t…it may be that something fell off the building…”  
Dahler: “it has completely collapsed!”  
Jennings: (pause) “the whole side has collapsed?”  
Dahler: “the whole building has collapsed”  
Jennings: “the whole building has collapsed?”  
Dahler: “the whole building has collapsed… it just collapsed. There is panic on 
the streets, thousands of people running up Church Street, which is what I’m 
looking out on… The whole building has collapsed... The whole building has 
collapsed…”  
Jennings: “this is what it looked like moments ago… my God….”79 
 
Jennings was obviously stunned and overwhelmed by what he witnessed and at 
first, he struggled to comprehend the information that he was receiving. It was clear that 
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the scale of destruction was immense, and Jennings quickly brought up the likelihood of 
massive causalities. Scenes of the towers collapsing were followed by visceral footage of 
debris shrouding the streets as people frantically tried to escape, close-ups on sobbing 
eyewitnesses, darkness as the smoke blocked out the sun, and shots of injured individuals 
seeking help from emergency workers. This media format took the horrific imagery of 
the attacks and made them personal by focusing on the effect on individuals. Jennings 
later said in a recap for the day that, “in some ways it is a reminder of what happened 
when the challenger exploded, and the constant repetition of the explosion of the 
challenger space shuttle just drove into our collective consciousness all across the nation. 
What we had witnessed together, though were clearly unable to feel in the same way as 
those who were in the immediate area.”80 The construction of 9/11 as a collective, 
national tragedy was a key foundation for discourse that decried the attacks as acts of war 
and provided the main justification for a pro-war, patriotic, unified narrative that emerged 
in the wake of the attacks.  
 
Now What?: How News Networks Constructed a 9/11 Narrative and Shaped 
What it Meant to be “American” 
On September 11th, there was one question that was being asked on all the news 
channels: “Now what?” Thousands of lives had been lost and the wake of the planes had 
left behind a scar, in the form of a smoldering trail of carnage, on the landscape of two of 
America’s most important cities. Throughout the day, as Americans frantically sought to 
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understand and give meaning to the attacks, news networks quickly began to construct a 
narrative of America at war, of “America under Attack.”81 In this section I will analyze 
how network anchors relied on historical references to past crisis, namely Pearl Harbor 
and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, to ground their pro-war narrative. 
Additionally, I will examine how networks took cues from the government on how they 
should interpret the attacks. Finally, I will analyze how the networks’ coverage of 9/11 
determined what it meant to be “American” or “un-American.” In doing so, I will 
primarily focus on how networks and government officials worked together to shape 
collective memory of the attacks and embed a sense of patriotic American identity linked 
to national unity. 
One of the most important narrative elements that emerged in network coverage 
of the event was the argument that the terrorist attacks constituted “an act of war” against 
the America and the free, civilized world globally. In Reynolds and Barnett’s study of the 
first twelve hours of CNN’s coverage, they observed several thematic clusters that 
created a dominant frame – that war was the only appropriate response to restore the 
security of the nation and prevent additional terrorist attacks. By establishing the historic 
significance of the attacks and the collective trauma endured, media outlets could justify 
the need for a military response. In CNN’s coverage, the word “war” was used 234 times 
in the first twelve hours and accompanied by comments from officials who solidified the 
militaristic narrative. According to Reynolds and Barnett, once sources suggested that the 
attacks were an “act of war,” journalists “began to incorporate that into their questions 
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and their own interpretations of the events.”82 In Journalism after 9/11, Barbie Zelizer 
argues that media coverage of 9/11 restructured the meaning of “America” into a body 
politic prepared for war.83 Additionally, visual cues reinforced this narrative, illustrated 
through the slogans outlets produced for their 9/11 coverage (“America under Attack,” 
etc.) and the symbolic images of the American flag.   
News agencies quickly interpreted the attacks into a larger narrative of war and 
America, and American values, under siege. Just minutes after the first tower collapsed, 
ABC’s host Peter Jennings remarked that while he had no explanation for the events, 
“Just looking at that… When was the last time the United States was attacked in this 
fashion – it was Pearl Harbor in 1941.”84 References to Pearl Harbor were common and 
fed into the narrative that the entirely of America was under attack, not just from a small 
group of now-dead radicals, but from a looming entity, “terror,” that was harbored in 
countries abroad. Of course, similar to Pearl Harbor, speeches by President Bush and 
other news anchors portrayed the attacks were seen as completely unprovoked, the 
actions of “cowards” and “madmen” who despise the United States. Although the role al 
Qaeda played in orchestrating the attacks was not officially confirmed on September 11, 
as media coverage of the day unfolded many suspected Bin Laden was behind the 
attacks.85 
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In the media’s simplistic coverage, this hatred was not seen as have any logic or 
basis but was portrayed to the public as an abhorrence for American values – of freedom, 
liberty, democracy, justice – not for American foreign policy in the Middle East. In 
addition to references to Pearl Harbor, many news agencies made connections to the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, even before the plane crashes were officially proclaimed 
terrorist attacks. Commentators on CNN asked a witness describing the first crash (before 
the second had taken place) if she had been in the city when the World Trade Center was 
bombed in 1993, and after the collapse of the first tower, Jennings on ABC said that, “if it 
is a terrorist attack… we may have seen the second coming of that plan.” In comparing 
the attacks to the 1993 bombing, reporters integrated 9/11 into a larger, pre-existing 
conflict with terrorism. By being seen as part of a larger trend, military response appeared 
even more necessary and justified.  
Additionally, the media shaped American collective interpretations of 9/11 
through the use of particular sources, which privileged pro-war framing. Multiple media 
studies analysis of the initial coverage found that the news agencies relied on a limited 
range of sources for expert comment and evaluation, giving preferences to institutional 
figures, almost exclusively from the military, political, and intelligence establishments.86 
This privileging of sources close to centers of state power placed what David Holloway 
refers to as a “disproportionate weight on ‘official or credentialed sources,’ and tended to 
ignore alternative or popular ones.”87 Reynolds and Barnett concur with this point, 
finding that CNN “relied almost exclusively on current and former government officials 
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to provide interpretation of the day’s events and to effectively frame what had happened 
and what would happen as a result.”88 It became very early on what would have to 
happen, with the entire nation united behind the president, a mandate for war seemed 
clear. In An Anthology of Dissent, Phil Scraton writes that politicians, and the media, 
were able direct the unmoored spirit of grief into a narrative of “vengeance masquerading 
as the pursuit of justice in defense of global freedom.”89 Whether it was vengeance or a 
quest to protect the nation, news networks’ discourse in the wake of 9/11 was largely 
emotional and simplistic. By virtue of their form, cable news networks are not 
particularly well suited to complex storytelling. In depth exposés into the complicated 
history of American policy in the Middle East are difficult for anchors used to reducing 
information into pithy, innovative soundbites. Thus, through the lens of cable news 
networks, 9/11 was simplified into a morality tale centered on patriotism, victimization, 
and heroes.90 Network news coverage narrowed, rather than broadened, meaningful 
discourse that sought explain and internalize the attacks.91 Thus, the media and 
government officials worked hand in hand to guide the vital first stages of collective 
memory development, shaping the public’s understand of what ‘9/11’ signifies and how it 
fits in to a larger American identity.  
In addition to narrowing public discourse regarding 9/11’s meaning as an act of 
war, the media also limited what it meant to be “American” or “un-American” in the 
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wake of the attacks. In the introduction to this thesis I discussed the political turmoil 
dividing the nation prior to September 11th. After the 2000 presidential election the rift 
was starkly clear, there was not only a distinctly divided red and blue electoral map, there 
were what many referred to as “two rival Americas.” In an article for Atlantic Monthly 
after the election, David Brooks wrote, “These differences are so many and so stark that 
they lead to some pretty troubling questions… Are Americans any longer a common 
people? Do we have one national conversation and one national culture? Are we loyal to 
the same institutions and the same values?”92 In this context 9/11 emerged as a powerful 
catalyst, one that had the potential to engender bitter dissent or historic unity.  
The weakness of Bush’s presidency, the failure of the national security apparatus 
to protect the nation, and the preexisting political division could have caused rancorous 
dissent to characterize the nation in the months after the crisis. One of the core pillars of 
American identity is the presidency as a national paterfamilias, in other words the 
president is considered the symbolic embodiment of the nation.93 This integral symbol of 
collective, national belonging seemed to be threatened on September 11th, with Bush 
disappearing for hours after the attacks and then stumbling badly during the brief 
appearances he made in front of the cameras.94 When Bush delivered his address to the 
nation live on TV that evening, his lackluster performance did little to reassure viewers or 
quell fears that he was incapable of leading the nation through this crisis as commander 
in chief. Yet despite this, media networks continued to strongly back Bush, arguing that 
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his lack of presence was a sign that he was coordinating America’s response. CNN 
provided reassurances, stating that Bush was busy “marshaling all the resources of the 
federal government.”95 Other channels echoed this sentiment, and together the media was 
remarkable successfully in asserting the President’s ability to lead the nation, thus 
preserving one of the critical components of American national identity.  
Furthermore, the terrorist attacks could have been immediately condemned as a 
failure of the national security apparatus dedicated to protecting the country, but instead 
initial media coverage portrayed that attacks as so incomprehensible, they could not have 
been prevented. During ABC’s coverage, the hosts spent the moments after the collapse 
of the first tower talking about how the United States had increased preparation in recent 
years for biological and chemical attacks but had never considered the hijacking of a 
plane.96 Although Jennings was far more critical of the government’s response to 9/11 
than other commentators, the doubt he raised about the intelligences agencies handling of 
the lead up to the attack was mild in comparison to the media critiques several years later. 
Reporters instead constructed the narrative that the attacks were unfathomable to the 
sane, civilized observers, an unprovoked attack on an innocent nation, that could not have 
been known or prevented.  
One of the defining narrative components that emerged in media representation of 
9/11 was the focus on national unity and cohesion that the attacks engendered. The media 
strongly influenced public understandings of responsibility in the wake of the attacks, 
championing “a nation unified” and prescribing what it meant to be “American” or “un-
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American” in the context of an attack on the nation. The theme, “a nation unified,” 
emerged because the sources of authority, politicians, were united across ideological 
lines. Of course, the assumption that CNN, ABC, and other mainstream news agencies 
were making was that Democrats and Republicans comprised the spectrum of viewpoints, 
and if they were united, it meant that the country was united. Sources who were 
interviewed on the day and the media outlets that were covering them never suggested an 
option that did not involve supporting the president wholeheartedly.97 Powerful video of 
the members of Congress spontaneously singing “God Bless America” at the foot of the 
Capital graced many news channels. CNN’s anchor Wolf Blitzer observed that it was “a 
pointed display of bipartisan unity at this critical moment in U.S. history” that illustrated 
Congresses commitment to sending “a message of unity during this difficult moment.”98 
Messaging from officials and media outlets fostered a sense of community, solidarity, and 
national commonality which is often missing from American politics.  
Government officials and the media worked symbiotically to shape collective 
memory from the outset of the attacks and ingrain a sense of patriotic ‘Americanness’ 
linked to national unity. The flip side of this narrative is that it made voicing political 
dissent, arguing for a historical basis to the attacks, and opposition to the president’s 
agenda “un-American.” Prescriptive patriotism meant that good Americans were required 
to stand united behind the president in times of crisis, and that solidarity for the victims 
of the attacks meant support for the government’s course of action. This sense of unity 
was short lived, however, because it rested on the emotional experience of shared wounds 
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and a fear of external threat.99 Although incredibly powerful when it existed, effectively 
quelling any dissent against the initial agenda for war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the power 
of 9/11 imagery faded as the day moved out of the realm of current events and into 
national history.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
After 9/11, several of the network hosts developed a near celebrity status, still 
honored years later for their coverage of the attacks on September 11th. Former 
broadcaster Marvin Kalb, executive director at the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, 
Politics, and Public Policy, said that, “When something happens that is jarring to the 
system, and this surely was, you turn to symbols of continuity, of reassurance, and [the 
network anchors] served that role.”100 Peter Jennings described how the universal 
comment he gets in emails thanking him for his role as ABC’s host on 9/11 are praise for 
remaining calm during the crisis.101 Jennings in just one example, Aaron Brown and Dan 
Rather are others, of the way journalists themselves became significant witnesses and 
conduits for the most positive memories of 9/11. During their coverage of the attacks, 
network hosts stopped saying 'you,' and they started saying 'we' and 'us.'102 The change to 
"'We are suffering, we are feeling, our country has been hurt,” reflected the level of 
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empathy and subjectivity that made the news networks’ coverage of 9/11 incredibly 
powerful for so many people.103 
In response to questions about 9/11, Americans all across the country often say, “I 
remember exactly where I was and what I was doing when I found out the towers were 
hit.” The powerful, national scope of 9/11, illustrated by this message, was largely 
constructed by media coverage during and after the attacks. Through the lens of the 
media, American collective memory was molded to fit into key frames. Narrative and 
cultural understandings focused on the historical significance of the attacks, the 
experience of collective trauma, the war mentality that emerged, and the national unity 
that was created. Each of these elements factor into the collective memory of 9/11 and 
shaped its transition from a current event to a moment in national history. I would like to 
conclude this chapter with CNN anchor Aaron Brown famous words, uttered at 10:28 am 
EDT, when the second tower of the World Trade Center collapsed: “good Lord… there 
are no words.” While Americans across the nation watched the devastation of the terrorist 
attacks unfold, so too did reporters, and their emotional coverage of the attacks went a 
long way in embedding the experience deeply into the collective consciousness of the 
nation.  
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Chapter Three 
Official Responses to 9/11: The Legacy of September 11th in Presidential 
Speeches 
As the head of state, the president is a powerful actor with the authority to mold 
the meaning of events for the public and situate them within a broader national context.  
Presidents use speeches as a medium to promote their goals, which can include endorsing 
policy initiatives or assuaging public fears, and as a way to define and reinforce the 
essential values that unite their populace. Given the president’s role in influencing the 
meaning of events on a national scale, the president and presidential speeches have a 
uniquely important role in the formation of collective memory. The three presidents who 
have served after the September 11th attacks have shaped public interpretations and 
collective memory of the event in important ways. George Bush, Barack Obama, and 
Donald Trump stand for widely divergent political views, but their speeches have 
constructed a relatively stable set of meanings for the tragedy and its relationship to 
American national identity. Over nearly two decades, they have reinforced the memory of 
9/11 as a moment that simultaneously reflected the country’s vulnerability and America’s 
exceptional strength, resolve, and unity in the face of disaster. Yet, Trump’s use of Twitter 
has undermined that consistent messaging and introduced new political uses for the past.  
In this chapter, I will analyze the speeches of presidents George W. Bush, Barack 
Obama, and Donald Trump and the way in which each president shaped and utilized 
collective memory of 9/11. In the first section, I will give a brief overview of the 
historical context in which the September 11th attacks occurred and the state of the Bush 
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presidency at the time. I will examine how Bush’s speeches after 9/11 promoted a 
narrative of American exceptionalism in order to restore collective confidence in the 
nation, encourage unity, and legitimize the country’s embroilment in a “War on Terror.” 
In the next section, I will focus on the speeches delivered by President Obama when 
Osama Bin Laden was killed, and on the 10th and 15th anniversaries of the attacks. In 
particular, I will ground Obama’s framing of the attacks in the context of his political 
need to appear patriotic and stimulate consensus during a time of increasing polarization 
and dissent. In the final section, I will focus on how President Trump has challenged 
Bush and Obama’s portrayal of 9/11 and has created new narratives around the attacks to 
legitimize his anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, “America-first” rhetoric.  
 
President George W. Bush  
When the four planes crashed in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania, 
there was no set template for government officials to draw upon. The scale of death and 
destruction was unprecedented. That said, America had experienced frequent acts of 
terrorism in the 1970s and 1990s. According to journalists at the RAND corporation and 
CNN, contemporary global terrorism emerged in the 1970s.104 Over the course of the 
decade, nearly 9,840 incidents of terrorism were recorded worldwide, and more than 
7,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks.105 By the mid 1970s, airline hijacking and 
airline bombings worldwide were occurring at the rate of one a month, and by 1978, over 
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a hundred terrorist attacks occurred per year in the United States.106 As a response to the 
famous terrorist attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, President Nixon 
created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, an organization that provided the 
initial framework for the United States’ current counterterrorism structure and policy.107  
While incidents of terrorism in the United States slowed in the 1980s, there was a 
resurgence of attacks and deaths in the 1990s. Rising concerns over terrorism 
domestically and abroad influenced President Clinton’s rhetoric and informed the Bush 
administration’s response to 9/11.  
In the 1990s, President Clinton had laid out the foundational elements of what 
would become the “War on Terror,” championed by President Bush. In his 1998 State of 
the Union address, President Clinton told the nation that, “We must combat an unholy 
axis of new threats from terrorists, international criminals, and drug traffickers.”108 Much 
of the rhetoric used by Clinton, in response to terrorist attacks committed on smaller scale 
against the United States, provided the foundation for Bush’s contextualization of 9/11. 
Both presidents relied on similar elements in their speeches to the nation: the need for 
decisive intervention, the need for Americans to be resolute towards ultimate victory, and 
the claim that America was the target of terrorism not for its policy decisions, but for its 
values.109 While an all-out war on terrorism did not gain significant traction during 
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Clinton’s administration, the terrorist attacks on September 11th fanned the flames and 
enabled President Bush to use 9/11 to legitimize a broad war in the Middle East.  
In addition to concerns over terrorism, there was a fear that America was 
increasingly fracturing. During the 1990s a different conflict was ravaging American 
society, the so-called “culture wars,” where vehement disagreements on the cultural 
constitution of America were being fought between conservatives and progressives. 
James Hunter captured the essence of this conflict in his 1991 book Culture Wars: The 
Struggle to Define America. In his book, Hunter described how the dramatic realignment 
of people into two groups, progressive or orthodox, produced increased polarization in 
American politics and culture. Hunter writes, “Every day presents us with disheartening 
signs that America is fragmenting,” and as a result, “tensions over social issues… are 
undermining the cohesion of our union.”110 There was a perception that Americans were 
so caught up in division and dissent, little consensus could be reached when it came to 
important social and cultural issues. The fear of increased polarization and discord in 
America skyrocketed during the 2000 election, when George W. Bush won a narrow and 
highly contentious victory over Al Gore. In his first six months in office, Bush had an 
unusually low presidential approval rating, ranking 9th out of the eleven presidents who 
had been in office since 1945.111 Questions over the validity of his presidency and his low 
approval rating meant that Bush had no clear mandate to act, or claim to broad support, 
when the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11th, 2001. As a result, it was important 
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that Bush framed the attacks in a national narrative of American exceptionalism and as an 
attack on collective American values. In framing the attacks this way, Bush was able to 
rally the support of a broad coalition of Americans from all points on the political 
spectrum.  
When the planes crashed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was 
no clear precedent on how the president should act. The only other time in history that 
America had been attacked was at Pearl Harbor, which was neither part of the contiguous 
United States nor an attack on innocent civilians. In the chaos and confusion, Bush 
needed to provide the American people with assurances and guidance, advice that would 
resonate deeply with all Americans and provide a balm to the pain brought on by a 
collective trauma. Thus, Bush tailored the meaning of 9/11 to fit into preexisting social 
frameworks, highlighting shared American values of freedom, justice, liberty, and 
heroism. Bush’s initial speeches not only shaped collective memory of 9/11, but 
prescribed actions that “proper Americans” would take to honor the memory of those 
killed in the attacks. Thus, Bush used the collective memory of 9/11, rooted in older 
cultural discourses, to serve the political purpose of unifying the nation and initiating a 
global “War on Terror.” In particular, Bush addressed the threat posed to American 
identity and assuaged public fears by promoting a narrative of American exceptionalism. 
In doing so, Bush constructed a symbolic depiction of 9/11 that became a historical 
device ingrained in American national memory. In her book, In the Name of Terrorism, 
Carol Winkler writes that when a crisis occurs, the American public “looks to the 
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president for reassurance that the nation will again be safe.”112 The speeches that 
President Bush gave in the immediate wake of 9/11 were vital because of the 
responsibility Bush had to define the crisis and provide a framework for modern 
collective understandings of the event. In his article, “Our Mission and Our Moment: 
George W. Bush and September 11th,” John Murphy describes how the President’s 
rhetorical choices granted him the ability to “dominate public interpretations of the events 
of September 11th.”113   
Media outlets described 9/11 as the moment where many Americans experienced 
a “stark discovery of their nation’s vulnerability.”114 Fear and the sense of helplessness 
felt as a result of the attack was exacerbated by widespread media coverage and 
contributed to a sense of uncertainty and insecurity.115  In “War Zone: What Price 
Liberty?: The Clamor of a Free People,” Linda Greenhouse summarized the state of the 
nation after 9/11: “As the country struggles for its footing in the aftermath of terror, the 
process of resetting the balance will also be a process of national self-definition.”116 If the 
goal of the terrorists was to expose the vulnerability of the American people, as president, 
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it was Bush’s responsibility to reassure the public that America was not weak. Of course, 
the defined purpose of the attacks varied depending on the source. According to Bush in 
his September 20th State of the Union address, the rationale behind the attacks could 
simply be framed as an answer to the question “why do they hate us?” In response to this 
question, he argued that the members of al Qaeda “hate our freedoms -- our freedom of 
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each 
other.”117 In essence, the terrorists hated Americans for who they are, as leaders of 
civilization, as a nation of freedoms, and as a country of equals. In framing the 9/11 
attacks this way, Bush erased the historical and political context that gave rise to Islamic 
extremism. In Osama bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa, republished in 1998, he provides a very 
different explanation for al Qaeda’s anti-American views. In a call to Muslims around the 
world, Bin Laden declared jihad (defensive war) against Americans for their “blatant 
imperial arrogance;” for their thinly veiled incursions against Muslims under the auspices 
of the United Nations; for their support of an illegitimate Israeli state; and for the 
“occupation of Saudi Arabia, the cornerstone of the Islamic world.”118 The complex 
historical background of U.S. involvement and manipulation in the Middle East, which 
Bin Laden provides as the rationale for terrorist attacks against the United States, was 
largely ignored by government officials and news networks in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11. Instead, the Bush administration promoted an alternate narrative that portrayed 
America as an innocent, virtuous, unsuspecting nation brutally attacked by an 
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organization of evil and insane people. This portray simplified the multifaceted context in 
which the attacks occurred and allowed Bush to focus more on rebuilding faith in the 
nation’s strength and promoting national unity.  
A recurring theme in President Bush’s speeches was the threat posed to American 
exceptionalism as a result of 9/11. One of the founding principles of the nation, American 
exceptionalism is the idea that the United States and its people are unique and 
ideologically superior, both politically and culturally.119 In his seminal work What I Saw 
in America, British author G.K. Chesterton wrote, "America is the only nation in the 
world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even 
theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence.”120 This creed, and the values 
that go with it – liberty, egalitarianism, individualism – forms the core rationale for the 
United States’ ideological superiority.121 The concept of American exceptionalism has 
long been vital in American politics because it “transcends the ideological and partisan 
divides within the United States and serves to unite Americans around one common 
identity.”122 Throughout his speeches in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,  Bush cultivated 
the sense of a cohesive American identity predicated on the values of freedom and 
justice. This identity was then sharply juxtaposed with the evil, tyrannical, and violent 
character of the supporters of terrorists or any nations deemed un-American. In his State 
of the Union Address on September 20th, President Bush stated “On September the 11th, 
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enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country… All of this was 
brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world, a world where 
freedom itself is under attack.”123  By embedding the attacks in the context of American 
exceptionalism, Bush framed 9/11 as an attack on American values, a discursive device 
that enabled him to tap into a larger sense of collective national identity.  
While a heavy emphasis on universal values was important for promoting national 
identity, framing 9/11 as an assault on American values magnified the feelings of 
displacement, confusion, and fear that the physical attacks engendered. Although the 
carnage of the physical attacks was limited to New York, Washington D.C., and 
Pennsylvania, Bush’s construction of 9/11 as a threat to the American way of life meant 
that the impact of the attacks extended far beyond their tangible costs. Mike Milford, 
professor at Auburn University, wrote that, “when such crises occur, they undermine the 
assumption of supremacy and jeopardize the national identity it sustains.”124 The United 
States was no longer a nation immune to the fears of attack, which had long been a core 
component of American exceptionalism and national identity.125 Bush captured this 
sentiment in the opening remarks of his Address to the Nation on the September 11 
Attacks; “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack 
in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks…These acts of mass murder were 
intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat.”126 The fact that 9/11 threatened not 
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only individual citizens but more generally the American “way of life” explains why 9/11 
was quickly enshrined as a defining moment in American history.   
As a historic turning point, 9/11 gave Bush the opportunity to shape both 
collective memory and America’s response to the attacks. To do so, Bush promoted a 
narrative of American “resolve” that both assuaged public fears and laid the foundations 
for the “War on Terror.” In his address to the nation on September 11th, Bush 
acknowledged that the terrorists had attempted to scare the nation into disorder, but he 
insisted that “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our 
resolve for justice and peace… None of us will ever forget this day.”127 The effect of 
Bush’s statement was twofold: First, his reassurances restored a sense of confidence and 
normalcy that had been fractured in the attacks. Second, Bush’s statement provided the 
guiding principle with which “good” Americans were meant to respond. “Good” 
Americans, ones who were resolved, would stand by the president and his course of 
action, who would tout patriotic narratives of 9/11 and ignore dissenting opinions.128 
Hillary Clinton, often at odds with the Bush administrations agenda, clearly captured 
Bush’s sentiment, stating,  
“We will also stand united behind our President as he and his advisors plan the 
necessary actions to demonstrate America’s resolve and commitment… [New York] 
epitomizes who we are as Americans. And so, this in a very real sense was an attack on 
America, on our values, on our power, on who we are as a people… I have expressed my 
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strong support of the President… I know that everyone in this body represents every 
American, in making clear that we are united and stronger than ever.”129  
From the House floor to the streets of New York, the lack of dissenting opinions 
was startling. Former radicals from the 1960s, who condemned marionette-like displays 
of patriotism, displayed the stars and stripes.130 One of those radicals, sociologist Todd 
Gitlin, was quoted saying, “The flag affirms that you belong to a nation that has been 
grievously hurt, and you want to show solidarity.”131 Clinton’s speech and Gitlin’s quote 
illustrate the collective patriotic fervor the fed into national narratives on 9/11.  
The national unity that post-9/11 “resolve” produced gave Bush a mandate to 
pursue military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his very first address to the nation 
on September 11th, Bush began to outline the steps the United States will take to get 
justice for the terrorist attacks. In this speech, Bush already starting framing 9/11 and the 
United States’ response to the attacks within the context of a “War on Terror,” stating, 
“America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the 
world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.”132 On September 14th, 
Bush situated the new “War on Terror” in American collective history in order to cement 
9/11’s role in a new national narrative. In his speech on September 14th, he states, “In 
every generation, the world has produced enemies of human freedom… the commitment 
of our fathers is now the calling of our time.”133 The idea of a “calling,” which connotes a 
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responsibility to serve, further reinforced Bush’s rhetorical focus on patriotic duty to the 
nation. Additionally, the framing of 9/11 in the context of a larger history on human 
freedom allowed Bush to use the collective memory of 9/11 to legitimize war in the 
Middle East.  
Initially a controversial president with a questionable mandate to lead the 
American people, the outpouring of patriotic support after 9/11 gave Bush the base he 
needed to initiate wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. From an approval rating of 51% in 
August of 2001, Bush’s job approval rating skyrocketing to a shocking 90% after 9/11, 
the highest recorded rate of any United States president (See Figure 1).134 The nearly 
universal bipartisan support for Bush extended to the war in Afghanistan. On September 
14, 2001, the House unanimously passed H.R. 64: Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force, a bill that authorized the use of the United States Armed Forces against “those 
responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States” (see Figure 2).135 
The connection between Afghanistan and al Qaeda had been documented by the CIA 
prior to 9/11, so in light of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, it was clear to the Bush 
administration that the Taliban regime and al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan should 
be the United States first target in the new “War on Terror.”136 The connection to Iraq, 
however, was much more tenuous. The post-9/11 consensus still remained, however, and 
Bush was able to use that consensus and the memory of 9/11 to invade Iraq. On October 
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11, 2002, the House passed H.J. Resolution 114 authorizing the use of force against Iraq. 
Although some of the consensus had eroded in the year since the September 11th attacks, 
69% of the House voted in favor of the resolution (see Figure 3).137 The success of 
measures initiating the Iraq War relied in large part on Bush’s framing of the Iraq conflict 
in terms of the 9/11 narrative. In a speech delivered March 17, 2003, Bush explained to 
the world why America was going to war against Saddam Hussain’s Iraq,  
“The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep 
hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, 
including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one 
day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their 
stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our 
country, or any other. The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite 
this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it.”138 
The allusions to al Qaeda grounded Bush’s defense against terrorism in the 
horrifying memories of 9/11. Furthermore, introducing the visceral images of terrorists 
with a nuclear bomb and the destruction they could wreak compounded national anxieties 
that had begun on September 11th, 2001. The war in Iraq is a clear example of how a 
president can rely on collective memories and the symbolic meaning of an event to 
achieve political goals.  
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President Barack Obama 
When it comes to analyzing the collective memory of 9/11, it is important to 
acknowledge the role of hindsight. Memories of a crisis inevitable become bound up with 
the response to that crisis. In the case of 9/11, it is difficult for Americans to completely 
separate the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, from the subsequent “War on 
Terror” and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Barack Obama’s rhetorical use of 
9/11, however, demonstrates that collective memory of 9/11 is different from that of the 
“War on Terror.” Furthermore, speeches during Obama’s presidency illustrate how the 
symbolic meaning of 9/11 established by President Bush can be used as a political tool 
for future presidents.  
When Obama ran for president in 2008, Iraq remained a defining topic in the 
opening stages of debate.139 Unlike many of his democratic opponents, Obama was one 
of the few candidates who opposed the Iraq war from the beginning.140 His criticism of 
the war was one of his primary campaign platforms, and he was quoted saying, “We 
continue to be in a war that should never have been authorized… I am proud of the fact 
that way back in 2002, I said that this war was a mistake.”141 Public opinion regarding the 
War on Terror had soured in the intervening years between the Iraq invasion and Obama’s 
2008 campaign for president. In June 2007, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 
majorities in 32 out of 47 countries polled wanted NATO troops withdrawn as soon as 
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possible.142 This data shows that foreign support for American values abroad was 
dwindling, and the sacrifices being made to ensure global safety were no longer wanted. 
In addition to decreasing global support, American public opinion grew more negative as 
time passed. Polls in October 2001 indicated that 88 percent of Americans favored 
military involvement in Afghanistan, yet by August of 2009 a CNN opinion poll found 
that 57 percent of Americans opposed the war.143 The change in opinion was even more 
significant in the case of the Iraq War. According to a Gallop poll in 2002, 53 percent of 
Americans favored invading Iraq to remove Saddam Hussain from power.144 By 2008, 
public opinion had completely reversed, and Obama was elected into office on a 
campaign promise of withdrawing American troops from Iraq.  
At the same time he was campaigning against the war in Iraq and the secret 
detention facility at Guantanamo, Obama was smeared with accusations that alleged he 
was not born in the United States and that he was, in fact, a Muslim.145 The so-called 
“Birther Movement,” questioned “the status, location, date, legitimacy, and parentage of 
the president’s birth as a means of racializing and revoking his American identity and 
citizenship.”146 In addition to questions about his citizenship, Obama faced conservative 
rumors that he was Muslim with “jihadi intentions.”147 A controversial cover on The New 
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Yorker from July 21st, 2008, captured both of these rumors, portraying Barack Obama as 
a Muslim terrorist and Michelle Obama as a figure resembling the Black Panthers (see 
Figure 4).148 While the cartoon, titled “Politics of Fear,” was intended to satirize the 
conservative conspiracy theories villainizing Obama, many viewers felt it just reinforced 
negative stereotypes.149 The New Yorker cartoon, and the conspiracy theories it depict, 
illustrated larger concerns over Obama’s qualifications. In particular, racialized fears 
were often encoded in accusations that Obama was “un-American” and “soft on 
patriotism.”150 As a result, Obama used his speeches on the anniversaries of 9/11 as a 
political tool to illustrate his patriotism, reinforce preexisting collective memory of 9/11, 
and to remind the nation of a time when the American people were united.  
President Obama was a renowned speechmaker and his eloquent remarks 
thoughtfully memorialized the September 11th attacks is ways both similar and different 
from his predecessor. The rhetorical use of American exceptionalism was fundamental to 
Obama’s presidency, as it was a powerful way of communicating his patriotism to critics. 
Obama’s speeches about 9/11 are important because he dealt with three major events 
during his presidency: Osama Bin Laden’s death; the 10-year anniversary of the attacks; 
and the 15-year anniversary of 9/11 in the lead up to the 2016 election. More broadly, 
during his two terms as president, Obama had to deal with the divisiveness of three major 
crises: the 2008 Great Recession; the War in Afghanistan; and the War in Iraq. As a result, 
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Obama’s desire to promote a cohesive and confident America made highlighting 9/11 era 
collective memory and identity an important discursive tool.  
The death of Osama Bin-Laden is an important chapter in the legacy of 9/11 and 
one of the highlights of Obama’s presidency. In his speech on May 2, 2011, Obama 
reported to the nation that Bin-Laden was killed by United States forces in a targeted 
operation in Pakistan. Bin-Laden death represented the most significant achievement, 
according to Obama, in the nation’s decade long war on al-Qaeda and on terror.151 
However, Obama followed his congratulatory declaration with the caveat that “[Bin-
Laden’s] death does not mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that al-Qaeda will 
continue to pursue attacks against us. We must – and we will – remain vigilant at home 
and abroad.”152 This statement captures the lasting fear and sense of vulnerability that has 
racked the nation since the attacks on September 11th, 2001. A CBS news poll taken in the 
week leading up to the 10th anniversary of the attacks, four months after Bin-Laden’s 
death, found that 67 percent of Americans felt no safer as a result of his death.153 
Furthermore, Obama’s statement in May was accompanied by more warnings from the 
president that al-Qaeda was likely to strike the United States again.154 The lasting fear 
created by the shocking attacks has continued to shape American national identity, and as 
a result, presidential rhetoric.  
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Obama’s speech regarding the death of Osama Bin-Laden aimed to recreate the 
national cohesion of the time before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the message 
of fear was clear in Obama’s address on Bin-Laden’s death, he also included calls to 
American exceptionalism to buttress confidence in a cohesive American national identity. 
Obama describes how on September 11, 2001, “we were united as one American family,” 
and now, ten years later, Bin-Laden’s death illustrates “that America can do whatever we 
set our mind to. That is the story of our history, whether it’s the pursuit of prosperity for 
our people, or the struggle for equality for all our citizens, our commitment to stand up 
for our values abroad, and our sacrifices to make the world a safer place.”155 This 
powerful statement is both inspiring and successful at targeting core values that resonate 
with the American public. Obama’s comments paint an optimistic and rosy picture of 
America a decade after the attacks, one that did not quite match the political reality of the 
decade. Since 9/11, the nation had become increasingly polarized between Democrats and 
Republicans and bitter debates between the two sides resulted in standstills on legislation. 
Bipartisan support for any policy seemed unlikely and partisan divisions created stark 
discrepancies between Democrats and Republicans on how they viewed the president. 
For example, an average of only 14% of Republicans approved of Obama over the course 
of his presidency, compared with an average of 81% of Democrats.156 As a result of this 
increasing polarization, Obama highlighted national cohesion post-9/11 in his anniversary 
speeches as a means of reminding Americans of a time when they were united.  
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 The 10th anniversary of September 11th was one of the most important 
opportunities Obama had to reify the nation’s collective memories of that day. In a speech 
two weeks before the 10th anniversary of the September 11th attacks, Obama delivered 
remarks sentimentalizing the unity that followed the assault; “We were united, and the 
outpouring of generosity and compassion reminded us that in times of challenge, we 
Americans move forward together, as one people… So, as we mark this solemn 
anniversary, let’s summon that spirit once more. And let’s show that the sense of common 
purpose that we need in America doesn’t have to be a fleeting moment; in can be a lasting 
virtue – not just on one day, but every day.”157 Obama’s speech accomplishes two things; 
first, it reaffirms a particular depiction of 9/11 by tapping in to the same rhetorical 
national identity created by Bush in his speeches. Both presidents highlight how the 
tragedy brought out the best in the American people, focusing on celebrating the heroism 
and virtue of the nation’s people instead of on the carnage and insecurity the event 
caused. Second, the speech taps into a collective national identity created by shared 
experience of 9/11. In his speech, Obama argues that acts of national remembrance that 
speak to the “character and compassion of our people” are a “way to reclaim that spirit of 
unity that follow 9/11.”158 The “spirit of unity” is illustrative of belief in a shared 
American identity, regardless of race, religion, creed, or political ideology.  
Obama’s speech 15 years after the attacks on September 11th captures much of the 
same sentiment as his speech at the 10th anniversary, but with more of a focus on the 
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legacy of the event. The annual speeches that occur on September 11th always pay tribute 
to the lives lost, the sacrifices made, and the acts of heroism performed. Obama’s oratory 
prowess makes his speeches resonate even deeper, as is the case for his speech on 
September 11th, 2016. This was the last 9/11 speech Obama would give as president and 
occurred in the midst of a brutally divisive political campaign between Donald Trump 
and Hillary Clinton. The polarizing campaign exposed deep ideological fractures in 
American society, which made appeals to unity all the more desirable. In his address to 
the nation on the 15th anniversary of 9/11, Obama stated that “it is so important today that 
we reaffirm our character as a nation – a people drawn from every corner of the world, 
every color, every religion, every background – bound by a creed as old as our founding, 
e pluribus unum. Out of many, we are one. For we know that our diversity – our 
patchwork heritage – is not a weakness.”159 While acknowledge that differences exist, 
Obama asserts that there is a larger identity, predicated on shared heritage, that unites all 
Americans.  
This reminder of larger, collective, American identity takes on even more 
significance when placed in the context of Obama-Clinton-Trump relations. In the lead 
up to the 2016 election, Obama had endorsed Clinton and anointed her as his successor. 
Clinton was a career government official and the Democratic senator in 2001 when the 
terrorist attacks occurred. She had illustrated her potential commitment to bipartisan unity 
with her support of Bush in 2001 and 2001. Trump, on the other hand, was one of the 
most vocal proponents of conspiracy theories accusing Obama of being Muslim and from 
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Kenya. In 2011, Trump went on Fox News, claiming, "He doesn't have a birth certificate. 
He may have one, but there's something on that, maybe religion, maybe it says he is a 
Muslim…I don't know. Maybe he doesn't want that."160 The frenzy over Trump’s 
comments eventually got to the point that in April 2011, Obama appeared in the White 
House briefing room to denounce Trump and release the long-form version of his birth 
certificate.161 Thus, Obama use of the symbol of 9/11 in his 15th anniversary speech 
signifies the way presidents can use the memory of 9/11 to foster unity in an age of 
division.  
 
President Donald Trump 
The election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked a clear shift in the way presidents 
have invoked the memory of 9/11 and the way it which it is done. In the traditional 
speech format, Trump follows the same rhetorical framework employed by Bush and 
Obama, highlighting tales of American courage and unity in the face of crisis. Trump, 
however, is not a speech-making president. Unlike his predecessors, he relies heavily on 
Twitter to communicate his opinions, policy directives, and condemn his opponents. In a 
comprehensive survey of Trump’s Tweeting history, The New York Times found that at the 
beginning of his presidency, Trump Tweeted about 9 times per day.162 As a result, the 
Trump presidency has been defined by a near-constant stream of more than 11,000 tweets 
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over the course of 33 months.163 It is clear that unlike previous presidents, Trump’s main 
delivery mechanism for his messages has been social media posts, not formal speeches. 
The difference in content between Trump’s official speeches and his tweets illustrates 
how in his role of a more “traditional” presidential figure he relies on preexisting 
rhetorical framework, while in his dominate, more authentic discourse on Twitter he 
repurposes the memory of 9/11 to serve his “America-first” policies.  
Once elected as president, Trump’s official speech on September 11th, 2017, fell 
more in line with the rhetoric used by Bush and Obama. Like his predecessors, Trump’s 
speech focused on the image of a united America in the face of tragedy. In his opening 
remarks, he stated, “When Americans are in need, Americans pull together – and we are 
one country. And when we face hardship, we emerge closer, stronger, and more 
determined than ever… in that hour of darkness, we also came together with renewed 
purpose. Our differences never looked so small, our common bonds never felt so 
strong.”164 Trump’s remarks reinforce the unity narrative that presidents have promoted 
since September 11th, 2001. Throughout his speech he reinforces the themes of American 
resolve, strength, unbroken spirit, confidence, and superiority. He heavily relies on 
allusions to American exceptionalism throughout his speech, presented through his 
glorified depiction of the American military and comments on how “as we stand on this 
hallowed ground, we are reminded of the timeless truth that when America is united, no 
force on Earth can break us apart.”165 For all his faults when it comes to his depiction of 
 
163 Ibid.  
164 Donald Trump, “Read President Trump’s 9/11 Memorial Remarks,” Time, September 11, 2017, 
https://time.com/4935852/president-trump-9-11-september-speech-transcript-memorial/. 
165 Ibid.  
 67 
9/11 on Twitter, Trump’s nationalistic rhetoric lends itself well to perpetrating a national 
narrative of 9/11 predicated on American exceptionalism .  
On Twitter, Trump has broken with presidential tradition to use 9/11 imagery and 
references not to promote unity, but to stoke division and to legitimize his protectionist, 
isolationist, America-first policies. Twitter has revolutionized presidential communication 
in the Trump era and has altered the dynamic upon which the president and the public 
interact. Unlike traditional forms of new media, Twitter allows users to curate 
information, report news in real time, and share opinions with a broad swath of the 
public. While Obama also used social media, Twitter in particular, throughout his 
campaigns and presidency, he was never as prolific as Trump. As of December 2019, 
Trump’s personal Twitter account (@realDonaldTrump) has more than 67.9 million 
followers and 47.4 thousand tweets.166 Trump has been incredibly active on the platform, 
both during his campaign and since he took office. In doing so, he bypasses the press and 
formal speechmaking to directly engage with the American public. Given that the tweets 
that Trump posts to his @realDonaldTrump are considered official White House 
statements, it is important to analyze his tweets as a form of presidential speech.167 
Trump’s tweets both politicizes 9/11 as a campaign issue and lays the foundation for his 
anti-immigrant policies.  
During his 2016 campaign for president, Trump utilized references to 9/11 to 
condemn his political rivals, particularly Jeb Bush. In a post on December 9, 2015, 
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Trump wrote, “@ray_aub @nytimes @CNN People forget that the policies of leaders 
like @JebBush allowed 9/11 killers to immigrate, drive, & pilot planes.”168 While 
Trump’s comment addresses the governmental oversights that left the nation vulnerable 
to the terrorists attacks, he does so not to advocate for a stronger America in the aftermath 
of its mistake but to mock a political rival. Instead of reflecting on the severity and 
solemnity of the 9/11 attacks, Trump made petty comments on Twitter. In a tweet on 
October 16, 2015, he wrote, “@JebBush, At the debate you said your brother kept us safe 
– I wanted to be nice & did not mention the WTC came down during his watch, 9/11.”169 
By blaming George W. Bush for 9/11 and failing to do his primary job as president, 
Trump promoted blame, division, and anger against establishment politicians, instead of 
encouraging a narrative of national unity and resolve.  
One of Trump most notable campaign promises was to protect America from 
terrorism by limiting immigration. Trump stoked anti-Muslim sentiment when we 
retweeted a report about “swarms” of celebrators in Jersey on September 11th.170 In 
November of 2015, he had claimed he “watched the World Trade Center go down” and 
also watched in New Jersey as “thousands of people were cheering as the building was 
coming down.”171 Yet factfinders in the wake of Trump’s claims found no evidence that 
any such event in New Jersey occurred and multiple news outlets, police reports, and 
politicians all stated that it never happened.172 The case of the alleged 9/11 celebrators in 
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New Jersey illustrates the pitfalls of Trump’s twitter. Official government statements are 
assumed to be factually correct representations of events shared with the general public. 
Trump’s twitter posts, which chronically contains factually incorrect or unverified 
statements, misrepresents events and as a result, distorts public opinion. The purpose of 
this distortion is to provide legitimacy to his presidential agenda of limiting immigration 
and promoting “America-first.” By fueling anti-Muslim sentiment in his tweets, Trump 
aims to shift public opinion in his favor. The political purpose of Trump’s new 9/11 
narrative became clear on January 27, 2017, when Trump signed an Executive Order 
banning foreign nationals from seven predominantly Muslim countries from visiting the 
country for 90 days, suspended entry to the country of all Syrian refugees indefinitely, 
and prohibited any other refugees from coming into the country for 120 days.173 The 
order sparked a contentious debate, where opponents accused Trump of being 
unconstitutional, racist, and un-American.174 From the outset Trump saw the travel 
restrictions as a “Muslim Ban,” which would “suspend immigration from areas of the 
world when there is a proven history of terrorism.”175 The original version of the ban, 
which Trump developed in 2015 and 2016, was explicitly intended to be law preventing 
Muslims from entering the country.176 While it eventually evolved into a territorial ban 
because of constitutional objections to a religious-based ban, the sentiment behind 
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Trump’s travel ban remained the same. Trump’s manipulation of the memory of terrorist 
attacks to stir anti-Muslim sentiment and influence immigration policy demonstrates the 
way Trump has drastically shifted how presidents interact with and use collective 
memory of 9/11.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
It has been nearly two decades since the terrorist attacks stole thousands of 
innocent American lives. Three different presidents have occupied the Oval Office, the 
American people have been embroiled in two-decade long wars, and government 
agencies spy on American citizens in the hopes of preventing another act of terror. In that 
time, the presidents have played a vital role in shaping collective memory of 9/11, 
fostering a national narrative that captures the remarkable solidarity, bravery, and 
ideological superiority of the American people. After 9/11, Americans of all walks of life, 
all political parties, came together under one nation, under one flag. President Bush and 
Obama focused on national unity in their speeches on 9/11, respectively creating and 
perpetrating the symbolic meaning of 9/11. Once meaning had been assigned, both 
presidents utilized collective memory of 9/11 to serve a tool to meet their political needs. 
Trump, on the other hand, represents how meaning is not fixed, and can be reconfigured 
to fit new contexts and serve new political ends. For Trump, the memory of 9/11 helps to 
legitimize his anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, “America-first” rhetoric. The analysis of 
Bush, Obama, and Trump illustrates how presidents play an essential role in shaping the 
memory and meaning of 9/11 for generations to come.  
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Chapter Four 
Commemorating 9/11: Enshrining Memory in the National 9/11 Memorial 
and Museum 
When the towers collapsed, one of the most iconic symbols of New York and 
America was destroyed amongst the rubble. The World Trade Center was not only a 
potent cultural symbol but a major industrial hub in the center of downtown New York. 
Each tower, 110 stories tall, provided almost ten million square feet of office space for 
35,000 people and 430 companies.177 Around 70,000 tourists and commenters visited the 
WTC complex every day.178 September 11th became a day that will always have 
particular connotations of national unity, collective trauma suffering, and resilience. 
However, as time passes, the immediacy of that trauma and the intimate memory of it 
becomes more distant. Over time, first-hand experiences by those living at the time of the 
event, became history, a much more distant and abstract form of remembering. Knowing 
this, state officials employed architects and designers to create memorials that will 
communicate the emotions of the contemporary societies to its descendants. The planners 
orchestrating the rebuilding of Ground Zero had to balance diverse stakeholders with 
competing claims to the memory and meaning of 9/11 with the state’s goal of promoting 
national values and ideals. Additionally, the master plan for Ground Zero had the 
challenging responsibility of commemorating the dead while also rebuilding a space for 
the living. 
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In the first section of this chapter, I will examine how major developments in the 
practice of commemoration, looking at World War II memorials and the Vietnam 
Veterans memorial, influenced the design of the 9/11 Memorial and Museum. In the 
second section, I will focus on the development of the memorial at Ground Zero and 
analyze how contentious public debates on the direction and design of the memorial 
served as avenues for collective remembering. Additionally, I will examine how the 
memorial provided both an interpretive framework and key lessons that shaped the 
narrative promoted at the 9/11 museum. In the third and final section of this chapter, I 
will demonstrate how competing official and popular interests, practical concerns, and 
issues of collective memory came to a head in the proposal for a cultural center on 
Ground Zero. The first half of this section will be dedicated to examining the reasons 
behind the failure of the International Freedom Center, while the second half will focus 
on how the 9/11 Museum personalized collective memory and initiated a perpetual 
process of commemoration.  
 
Contextualizing Commemoration: An Overview of World War II Memorials and 
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
Monuments are the intersection where public art meets national memory and, over 
time, they have reflected evolving aesthetic, cultural, and political views. Modern forms 
of memory and memorial structure arose during the French and American revolutions, 
when citizens sought to reject past notions of aristocracy and hierarchy and instead 
design a radically new democratic future and a radically new style of commemoration. 
The pompous, ostentatious and heroic monuments dedicated to individuals largely faded 
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during the revolutionary era, because in the new democratic societies this memorial style 
was no longer capable of commemorating nationally significant events. Liberal republics, 
founded upon the principles of self-governance, were the antithesis of the monarchical 
forms of memorization. While hierarchical nations could easily impose upon their 
subjects a narrative about the past, republics must incorporate different constituents who 
all have their own version of history that they hope will be the basis of national 
memory.179 In a famous 1943 essay entitled “Nine Points on Monumentality,” Sert, 
Leger, and Giedion argue that “Monuments are…only possible in periods in which a 
unifying consciousness and unifying culture exist.”180 In America, like in other modern 
countries, there is certainly no permanent form of consensus. Thus, modern societies rely 
on the “rhetoric of monumentality” and a sort of “pseudo-monumentality” that strives to 
protect and pass on common values and ideals.181 Young argues that “the more 
fragmented and heterogeneous societies become, it seems, the stronger their need to unify 
wholly disparate experiences and memories with the common meaning seemingly created 
in common spaces.”182 Thus, a monument, embedded in physical, shared space, creates 
and furthers the illusion that there is a collective memory dependent on collective 
remembering of the past.  
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WWI memorials were aesthetically, conceptually, and physically different from 
anything that had come before.183 The new era began in January of 1915, when recording 
and registering the dead became a state responsibility in a way it had not been before.184 
Once the war was over the memorializing process began, a new memorial tradition arose 
where monuments revolved around large panels with the inscription of soldiers’ 
names.185 At the same time, minimalist valleys of white cross grave markers served a 
unique form of memorialization that had important public and private significance.186 
These national cemeteries, often built on the site of major battles, visually illustrated the 
sheer scale and numbers of dead and recognized sacrifice for the sake of the nation. 
These men were buried together, despite their different religious, regional, or ethnic 
backgrounds, because they were united in a common purpose, moment in history, and 
will forever be remembered in the national framework of service to one’s country. Prior 
to the war, memorials were most often built to commemorate victory, but after WWI 
memorials are often created to honor collective suffering. These new memorials had to 
provide a space for collective grieving, a way for citizens to process and overcome the 
cultural trauma of war.187 The democratization of memorialization, in the form of the 
names engraved in WWI monuments, and the blend between public and private 
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monument are important factors that continue into the post-national phase of 
commemoration and eventually the 9/11 memorial process.  
Another revolution in commemoration occurred in the 1960s with the birth of the 
anti-monument movement, in which advocates rejected the traditional notion of a 
monument as a site of ritualized and institutionalized memory. The drastic aesthetic and 
epistemological changes in commemoration emerged out of a shift towards embedding 
remembering in everyday life.188 In America, unprecedented upward and outward 
mobility made people feel like they were losing touch with the past.189 Monuments, 
memorials, and museums were essential in counteracting the feelings of isolation and 
rootlessness because they fostered a sense of collective identity, a shared history, that all 
Americans could fit themselves within. Memorials inspired by the anti-monument 
movement aimed to bridge the gap between “the past and present, between memory and 
history.”190 At the same time, these modern memorials aimed to incorporate the 
competing claims to history that often divide any attempt at a single national narrative.  
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, an influential ideological predecessor to the 
9/11 Memorial, is considered by many scholars to be the first and best American post-
national monument. The memorial, designed by Maya Lin, was deeply contested and 
wracked by conflicting official and vernacular interests. Defenders of the nation-state, 
including state officials and citizens inspired by patriotic duty, wanted to use the 
memorial as a device to foster national unity and patriotism after a particularly bloody 
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and divisive conflict.191 At the same time, the dominant voice in memorial project was 
that of the ordinary people directly impacted by the war: veterans, family members, and 
their loved ones.192 According to John Bodnar, non-state interest groups, such as grieving 
families, “convey what social reality feels like rather than what is should be like. Its very 
existence threatens the dogmatic and timeless nature of official expressions.”193 Lin’s 
memorial, designed in 1981, combines elements of classical American design and 
minimalism with the Great War memorial style.194 Furthermore, the memorial rejected 
typical displays of patriotic symbolism to focus on pure form.195 At the time, the 
memorial created a massive amount of controversy with many defenders of the nation 
state feeling that the memorial was an insult and a failure.196 Yet, in the nearly 40 years 
since the construction of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Maya Lin’s design has largely 
been considered one of the greatest successes in memorialization.  
The complexities and tensions of contemporary commemoration occurs because 
the need for a unified understanding of the past is at odds with the modern belief that the 
past is never has just one meaning. The stylistic complexities of memorialization are one 
of the main arenas where competing official and vernacular interests, practical concerns, 
and issues of collective memory come to a head in the wake of 9/11.  
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Creating the 9/11 Memorial: The Contested Process of Attributing Meaning to a 
Tragedy 
In the wake of the attacks, there were two integral and opposing jobs that state 
and local officials had to contend with. On the one hand, officials in New York needed to 
create a quasi-national memorial that would memorialize collective memory of 9/11 and 
honor the 2,977 lives lost in the terrorist attacks on September 11th. On the other hand, 
the attacks had destroyed New York’s prime commercial center, and officials needed to 
replace the former WTC with a new commercial hub that could serve the business needs 
of the city. Complicating these obligations were a variety of public interest groups who 
all had a stake in the site and the commemoration process. There was complex array of 
local, state, and federal officials leading the process (see Figure 1) and different designers 
and contractors for and within each element of site. All of these bodies had to take into 
consideration the views of the different coalitions of survivors and victims’ families, 
advocates for first responders, and the business community. Public needs, both 
commercial and political, conflicted with the complex cultural and private emotional 
needs to memorialize the attack. In this section, I will focus on the development of the 
memorial at Ground Zero and how the process of commemoration served as the nation’s 
first attempt at interpreting collective memory and capturing it in a tangible site. First, I 
will examine the role of contentious debates over the direction and design of the 
buildings at Ground Zero and how these debates served as avenues for collective 
remembering. Second, I will analyze how the memorial provided a framework that 
shaped the narrative promoted at the 9/11 museum. While the memorial did not 
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permanently set either the memory or meaning of 9/11, it did offer frames of 
understanding that continue to hold power for new generations. 
When the debris and wreckage had finally been cleared from the site of the former 
World Trade Center, officials relied on the existing frameworks of past memorials in 
their process of commemorating 9/11. Throughout 2002, many public forums met to 
debate the proper course of action, while at the same time officials at the Lower 
Manhattan Development Company (LMDC) and the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey determined a shortlist of architectural, planning, and engineering teams for 
the concept studies of the WTC site.197 Six designs from the shortlist were selected by 
Beyer Blinder Belle and reviewed in a public forum on July 20, 2002. This town hall 
meeting, called “Listening to the City,” was attended by over 4,000 people.198 This 
meeting included a wide variety of people, from schoolteachers to professional planners 
to family members of the victims, all invited to engage with the memory of 9/11 and how 
they wanted it to manifest in a piece of commemorative urban design. In ten-person 
tables, they listened to and debated the presentations of the first-round of proposed master 
plans for the WTC site and rejected them all.199 Each of Beyer Blinder Belle’s plans 
aimed to please all of the disparate stakeholders, and in doing so, the designs failed. 
A vast majority of stakeholders accused the initial plans of perverting the sanctity 
of the Ground Zero site by doing too much to rebuild the land and not enough to honor 
the dead. Out of the people who rejected the plans, the most vehemently opposed were 
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the families of 9/11 victims. Many of the families of the 9/11 victims regarded the 
sixteen-acre WTC site as a sacred burial ground of sorts, the last resting place for victims 
of a horrifying tragedy. During the memorial competition, family members spoke in favor 
of “providing a memorial that would not only take into account the need to appropriately 
commemorate both the devastation and heroism of September 11 but would also reflect 
their personal needs for memorialization.”200 This sentiment is best captured by Anthony 
Gardner’s statement, written on the behalf of the Coalition of 9/11 Families, that states: 
We and the tens of thousands of supporters who fought for this memorial did so, 
not because we wish to turn these few acres in Lower Manhattan into a cemetery 
or convert the site into one of enduring sadness. We did so because of our 
unshakable belief that this is Sacred Ground, that the truth should be told there, 
and that the core values of our nation will be demonstrated by the lives 
remembered, the deeds done and the spirt reawakened.201 
 
This statement beautifully illustrates how Ground Zero is both a place of personal 
memory, but the site of cultural memory for millions of Americans and citizens around 
the world. Although many families felt that the entire sixteen-acre site should have a 
“sacred quality,” that was challenging given New York’s commercial needs. Thus, while 
the needs of family members influenced the deliberation when it came to the future of the 
site, they had to compete with the requirements of the site to promote commerce, culture, 
and commemoration.  
After the initial set of designs were rejected, the LMDC and the Port Authority 
called for an “Innovative Design Study” that would produce a novel master plan that 
could address some of the tensions in the memorial process. On September 26, 2002, 
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seven finalists were announced and on February 4, 2003, the finalists were narrowed 
down to two designs, that of Daniel Libeskind’s “Memory Foundations” and of THINK 
team’s “World Cultural Center.” When the innovative designs of the master plan finalists 
were released, some believed that the “whole thing was a memorial” because both 
designs had such prominent memorial elements.202 One example of this is Libeskind’s 
1,776 foot tall “Freedom Tower,” which was clearly designed to prove America’s 
resilience and ability to rebuild after the attacks.203 While some felt that these elements 
were enough to satisfy the commemorative needs of 9/11, The LMDC, however, 
recognized that there was a need for a designated, official memorial. James Young 
commends the LMDC’s commitment, writing “as tempting as it may be to allow the new 
building complex to serve as a de-facto memorial, the conflation of re-building and 
commemoration would also foreclose the crucial process of memorialization, a process… 
essential to both memory and redevelopment.”204 Memorialization enabled the process of 
collective remembering that was necessary to construct a narrative and meaning for 9/11. 
Furthermore, collective remembering, demonstrated in the debates over plans for Ground 
Zero, illustrated how contestations between narratives shaped collective memory in the 
years after the attacks.  
Throughout the debates on plans for Ground Zero, two main perspectives 
emerged. One perspective, championed by a group of the victims’ family members, 
argued that the entire 16-acre site of Ground Zero should remain empty and devoid of 
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any redevelopment. While many members of the public disagreed that the entire site 
should remain empty, most felt that some form of emptiness was needed to authentically 
capture the emotion and meaning of 9/11. Artist Shirin Neshat summarized this 
sentiment, remaking, “In order to remember the loss of lives, you need a certain amount 
of emptiness. If you build, it’s like you’re covering up the tragedy and [people] will 
forget it.”205 Joel Shapiro, whose sculpture Loss and Regeneration (1993) is located at the 
entrance to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C., echoed 
Neshat’s statement: “I think leaving the space empty would be the most effective 
remembrance. It’s like Berlin. You see the devastation…and that’s much more potent 
than any stupid monument you could build, because you have this real sense of what 
happened.”206 In essence, if the land was left completely empty, it could act as a 
memorial, representing the scar and void in both the city and the American psyche. Thus, 
advocates of this narrative aimed to embed the memory of 9/11 as a collective trauma 
into the physical landscape of Ground Zero and use the emptiness of the site as a visceral 
reminder for future generations.  
This perspective, however, was in direct contrast to those who viewed building a 
massive memorial as a roadblock to the city’s need for renewal and economic recovery. 
There was another perspective shared by many in the community, including both 
members of the business community and victim’s families, that the best way to 
memorialize the attack would be to rebuild the original skyscrapers.207 A collection of 
 
205 Doss, “Remembering 9/11.” 
206 Erika Doss, “Remembering 9/11.” 
207 Young, “Memory and the Monument after 9/11.” 
 82 
New Yorkers interviewed in January of 2002 expressed this sentiment. A police officer 
directing traffic at the perimeter of Ground Zero told a reporter that the towers should be 
rebuilt, otherwise the terrorists would be “getting the best of us.”208 Another interviewee 
said that he supported the idea of rebuilding the Twin Towers for the symbolism, the idea 
that "We're America. We're strong.”209 The artist James Turrell captured another side of 
this perspective, stating, “I feel we should rebuild... The new buildings should be higher 
than the old ones… We should not feel bad about building on top of the ashes. All 
cultures are built on top of earlier cultures.”210 Advocates in favor of rebuilding 
contextualized their arguments in a nationalistic 9/1l narrative predicated on proving that 
the nation remained strong in the wake of the attacks. In this sense, redeveloping Ground 
Zero with an assortment of skyscrapers would prove to the world that America was even 
bigger and better than it was before the terrorist attacks. This perspective, of course, 
completely contradicted the point of view of advocates who favored leaving Ground Zero 
empty. As a result, designers needed to find some way to balance rebuilding with 
commemoration and do so in a way that addressed the competing perspectives on the 
site.211 
In 2002-2003, the LMDC decided to host a memorial competition that would both 
prescribe certain kinds of memory to be preserved while allowing the aesthetic and 
architectural approach to be chosen by the applicants. A committee of Advisor Council 
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members and hand-picked professions and experts in public, appointed by members of 
the Families Advisory Council and the LMDC, crafted a ‘Memorial Mission Statement’ 
that served as a guiding order for the memorial. The final version of the ‘Memorial 
Mission Statement’ is included below:  
• Remember and honor the thousands of innocent men, women, and 
children murdered by terrorists in the horrific attacks of February 26, 1993 
and September 11, 2001.  
• Respect this place made sacred though tragic loss.  
• Recognize the endurance of those who survived, the courage of those who 
risked their lives to save others, and the compassion of all who supported 
us in our darkest hours.  
• May the lives remembered, the deeds recognized, and the spirit 
reawakened be eternal beacons, which reaffirm respect for life, strengthen 
our resolve to preserve freedom, and inspire an end to hatred, ignorance 
and intolerance.212 
 
By the time the design submission period closed, the committee had received 
13,800 registrations from 92 countries around the world and every state except Alaska.213 
The immense outpouring of submissions illustrates the profound importance of 9/11 not 
only in America but also the world. In the end, it came down to which design made the 
best memorial. Jurors picked Michael Arad and Peter Walker’s design because it 
embodied the feelings of loss and absence felt by the nation in response to horrific 
destruction of the World Trade Center and staggering loss of innocent lives. The 
footprints of the towers, two large voids containing recessed pools, communicates the 
feeling that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, left a permanent scar on both the 
American landscape and psyche. The surface of the memorial plaza is graced with rows 
of Sycamore trees, informal clears and groves that are meant to facilitate a sense of a 
 
212 Ibid.  
213 Ibid.   
 84 
living memorial. The memorial plaza, marked by the cycle of natural rebirth and public 
spaces, is designed to integrate into “the fabric of the city, the plaza encourages the use of 
this space by New Yorkers on a daily basis. The memorial grounds will not be isolated 
from the rest of the city; they will be a living part of it.”214 The combination of a formal 
memorial, that creates memory to be passed onto the new generation, and a living 
memorial, that provides individual spaces for memory within collective spaces, 
powerfully broaches the difficult task of memorialization in modern society.215  
The memorial itself is contained in the sacred ground below the surface of the 
plaza, where a band of victim’s names encircles the base of the pool. Ramps that border 
each void lead down to memorial spaces removed from the chaotic and everyday urban 
landscape on the surface. Once underground, the enormity of the space and of the pools 
but into perspective the vast scope of the destruction that occurred when the two 
monumental skyscrapers collapsed.216 A thin curtain of water and reflective sheets give 
off the illusion that the ghost of the towers is still there travelling down into the bedrock. 
The water flowing into an unknown abyss challenges the traditional static nature of 
monuments and creates a sense of motion which illustrates memory is not frozen or 
fixed.217 The voids left behind by the destruction of the twin towers are the primary 
symbols of loss in the memorial, meant to preserve the sense of emptiness that best 
captures the hollow, traumatic memories of the site. The dynamic nature of the memorial 
is further accomplished by the way visitors move into, though, and out of the site. 
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Visitors must engage with the memorial instead of just observing it from afar, and the 
experience imbues personal memory to the collective memory enshrined in the site. 
Additionally, Arad and Walker argue that “standing there at the water’s edge, looking at a 
pool of water that is flowing away into an abyss, a visitor to the site can sense that what is 
beyond this curtain of water and ribbon of names is inaccessible.”218 Thus, the memorial 
balances the need to commemorate and enshrine 9/11 in America’s national history while 
also recognizing that different people will have different relationships to the tragedy.  
Arad and Walker decided to engrave the names of the victims of the 9/11 attacks 
on the memorial in order to balance the need for a national memorial and a private grave 
marker. The blend of a public and private monument complicates the creation of a single 
collective memory of the attacks. On the one hand, the list of names means nothing, are 
merely a random collection of strangers that most visitors would never have met or 
known in their lifetime. On the other hand, the names of all these strangers joined 
together represents a larger narrative. Together, these innocent strangers embody 
America as a whole. They represent the immense diversity, in race, religion, ethnicity, 
and even nationality, of America. Regardless of whether the victims identified as 
American, they are forever part of the nation’s history and collective memory. The 
people who died on September 11th are remarkable because they were ordinary citizens 
mercilessly killed in attack on America. The attacks were not targeted, they were a 
weapon of terror that murdered civilians indiscriminately. Thus, the names that come 
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together to ring the memorial speak to a collective tragedy that has scarred New York, 
America, and the world.  
The effect of the names on the 9/11 Memorial is very similar to the effect of the 
pillars at the Denkmal Holocaust Memorial. James Young, a professor at Massachusetts 
Amherst and a member of the design selection committee for both the Berlin Denkmal 
and the September 11 Memorial, observed that, “the very idea of ‘collective memory’ is 
broken down here and replaced with the collected memories of individuals murdered, the 
terrible meanings of their deaths now multiplied and not merely unified.”219Arad and 
Walker hoped that the seemingly endless list of names would serve to recognize both the 
private horror of individual deaths and collective, public tragedy that wounded the nation. 
[In addition to the open area where visitors can come to recognize and remember 9/11, 
there is an area at the bedrock of the North Tower, where loved ones can mourn in 
private, next to a vault containing the unidentified remains of victims.220 This space 
serves the competing need for private and personal honoring of the dead outside of a 
national, collective context. 
While the memorial captures the elements of collective memory at the time of its 
creation, memory is not static. New viewers will interact the memory and its offered 
meaning as years pass and times change. The jurors selected Arad and Walker’s design 
because it “capture[d] most succinctly the twin motifs of loss and renewal already 
articulated so powerfully in Daniel Libeskind’s ‘Memory Foundations.’”221 The purpose 
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of Michael Arad and Peter Walker’s ‘Reflecting Absence” was to try to steer visitors 
away from the traditional impulse towards closure, to relegating an event to the annals of 
history, and instead encourage visitors to internalize the memory of the event in a larger 
collective history, one that constantly shapes national identity. Given the realities of 
maintaining the waterfalls and the trees, state officials who control the site and taxpayers 
who fund it will have to constantly engage with the memorial itself and the ways it may 
evolve. All the different design aspects of the memorial work in harmony to satisfy the 
‘Memorial Mission Statement,’ preserving the footprints of the towers, providing access 
to the bedrock, and weaving the site back into the fabric of the urban community.222 The 
integrative design of the physical memorial, one that combines remembrance with 
reconstruction, “meshes memory with life, embeds memory in life, and… balances our 
need for memory with the present needs of the living.” Thus, even as the city grows, as 
people bustle about Manhattan, and as years pass by, the memory of 9/11 will still be 
embedded in the national and individual conscious.223 
 
The Failure of the Freedom Center and the Rise of the 9/11 Museum: Debates 
over How to Preserve and Teach the Memory of 9/11  
On June 7, 2005, Debra Burlingame published a now-famous piece in The Wall 
Street Journal entitled “The Great Ground Zero Heist.” In the article, Burlingame 
vehemently argued against the proposed International Freedom Center (IFC), claiming 
that the building dishonored the memory of 9/11, of those who died in the attacks, and of 
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the men and women serving in Iraq. In a powerful appeal to the nation, Burlingame 
wrote, “Rather than a respectful tribute to our individual and collective loss, they will get 
a slanted history lesson, a didactic lecture on the meaning of liberty in a post-9/11 
world.”224 She goes on to argue that the designers of the IFC were “trying to hijack the 
meaning of 9/11,” whereas “we’re trying to rescue it.”225 Burlingame’s complaints 
capture the tenor of resentment that inspired the “Take Back the Memorial” movement, 
an alliance of 9/11 family members who insisted that their personal trauma gave them 
moral authority over the design and purpose of commemorative buildings at Ground 
Zero. Eventually, this movement and widespread protests on the fourth anniversary of 
9/11 forced officials to abandon the IFC project. As a result, only a dedicated 9/11 
Museum was constructed on the site of the former World Trade Center.  
 In this section, I will examine the rationale behind the opposition of the 
International Freedom Center and the reason for the project’s eventually failure. In 
particular, I will discuss how opponents perceived the IFC as an insult to the memory of 
those who died on September 11, 2001, illustrating the important role the public had in 
altering the commemoration process. Furthermore, I will analyze how the rejection of the 
IFC allowed the narratives of American innocence and ideological superiority to persist. 
This is because the IFC would provide the complex historical context that government 
officials and news outlets largely ignored in the initial aftermath of the attacks. By 
preventing the construction of an international cultural center, advocates were able to 
limit the interpretation of the attacks. Furthermore, after the IFC was abandoned, only a 
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9/11 Museum would be left to share the narrative of 9/11. In the second part of this 
section, I will analyze how the 9/11 Museum reinforced preexisting forms of collective 
memory and adapted to the lessons learned from the 9/11 Memorial and the failed IFC.  
The International Freedom Center 
 In June of 2003, the LMDC invited a wide variety of cultural institutions to 
submit proposals for a cultural complex built on Ground Zero. Out of 113 applications, 
the LMDC chose three in June of 2004. The Joyce International Dance Center and the 
Signature Theatre Company would occupy a performing arts center and the other two, the 
Drawing Center and the International Freedom Center (IFC), would be located within a 
museum complex.226 Yet as soon as the winners were announced to the public, families 
of 9/11 victims began to rally against them. Many objected to the construction of any 
buildings on Ground Zero that were not focused exclusively on telling the story of 9/11 
and its victims, which is why the IFC drew the most criticism.227 The IFC’s mission 
statement described the proposed project as an educational center dedicated to describing 
“humankind’s sometimes uneven but ultimately enduring aspiration for free and open 
societies.”228 Thus, the IFC was intended to integrate the events of September 11, 2001, 
into a broader historical context of battles for freedom.  
 The proposed IFC immediately garnered widespread condemnation because many 
members of the public feared that the center would complicate dominant 9/11 narratives 
and memories. Even worse, in the eyes of some opponents, was the fact that the leaders 
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of the project were well-known academics, journalists, and civil libertarians who largely 
opposed America’s political response to 9/11.229 Burlingame expressed the sentiment 
shared my many family members of 9/11 victims,  
“To the IFC's organizers, it is not only history's triumphs that illuminate, 
but also its failures… The public will be confused at first, and then feel 
hoodwinked and betrayed… The World Trade Center Memorial 
Foundation will have erected a building whose only connection to 
September 11 is a strained, intellectual one… More disturbing, the Lower 
Manhattan Development Corp. is handing over millions of federal 
dollars… [to] people whose inflammatory claims of a deliberate torture 
policy at Guantanamo Bay are undermining this country's efforts to foster 
freedom elsewhere in the world.”230 
 
Burlingame’s comments illustrate the way many members of the public feared that the 
IFC would challenge the dominant narratives surrounding the attacks. For example, 
opponents were concerned that the IFC exhibit would seek “to explain the actions of the 
terrorists, even though they were, in the eyes of the families, senseless and ultimately 
inexplicable.”231 As explained in previous chapters, one of the primary narrative 
components of 9/11 collective memory is the idea that the attacks constituted a an attack 
on American values, not American policy. The IFC exhibit could open up debates on 
alternate meanings for 9/11 and challenge accepted interpretations that had been created 
in the wake of the attacks. As a result, providing a historical contextualization was seen 
as threatening a fundamental component of the public’s collective understanding of the 
attacks.  
 The fears and outrage surrounding the IFC led to massive and highly contentious 
debates that demonstrated the fracturing the post-9/11 consensus. In a collection of letters 
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submitted to The Wall Street Journal after the publication of Burlingame’s article, 
various citizens captured the arguments at the heart of the “Take Back the Memorial” 
protest. Bill Kennedy, a survivor of the WTC attack, wrote “I feel the International 
Freedom Center's plan desecrates what is sacred ground and trivializes for political gain 
the most significant tragedy of a generation. It disparages all those who died that day and 
every day since defending our freedom.”232 Mike Denkler, a resident of Pensacola, 
Florida, wrote, “Tom Bernstein, George Soros, Michael Posner, Anthony Romero, Eric 
Foner, et al., are spending millions to promote their own "enlightened" self-interest to 
dilute what should be the single focus of the memorial: to honor and remember those 
patriots and brave souls who made the supreme sacrifice on Sept. 11, 2001.”233 On the 
other side of the argument, Michael Posner, a Human Rights activist in New York, wrote 
to The Wall Street Journal, stating, “The most disquieting aspect of Ms. Burlingame's 
argument is her blanket condemnation of individuals and organizations that are 
challenging the U.S. government's departure from the rule of law in the wake of 9/11.”234 
Each of these comments illustrate the way political divides, reopened after the start of the 
Iraq war, motivated debates of the meaning of 9/11 and the role of the memorial. 
Furthermore, the comments demonstrate how advocates of a “pure” 9/11 memorial used 
moral language to fortify their arguments. By using charged rhetoric, portrayed through 
the use of the phrases “sacred ground” and “patriots and brave souls,” opponents of the 
 
232 Bill Kennedy, Mike Denkler, and Michael Posner, “Sacred Ground Must Not Be Desecrated,” Wall 
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233 Ibid.  
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IFC legitimized their arguments and demonstrated their moral superiority over advocates 
in favor the of the IFC.  
Outrage against the IFC inspired the formation of an alliance of 9/11 family 
members and the creation of the “Take Back the Memorial” movement. The movement 
had two primary goals: first, to stop the construction of the IFC, and second, to make a 
memorial that dominated the space in Ground Zero.235 At the outset, the movement was 
primarily led by outspoken family members who believed their personal trauma gave 
them a right to decide how the Ground Zero space was used. However, the movement 
quickly gained more traction as other public interest groups expressed their support. For 
example, in August of 2005 the FDNY Union held a press release stating that if the IFC 
was included in the 9/11 memorial, the FDNY would withdraw its support of the 
LMDC.236 Soon after, a petition was signed by 49,000 people and sent to the LMDC and 
to the mayor’s office. The petition read as follows:  
 “We, the under-signed, believe that the World Trade Center Memorial 
should stand as a solemn remembrance of those who died on September 
11th, 2001, and not as a journey of history’s ‘failures’ or as a debate about 
domestic and foreign policy in the post-9/11 world. Political discussions 
have no place at the World Trade Center September 11th Memorial.”237 
 
As a result of this petition and the protest held on the fourth anniversary of 9/11, 
Governor Pataki announced that the IFC project would be abandoned so that progress 
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could be made on the memorial.238 Following the rejection of the IFC, the Drawing 
Center, which also supposed to be housed in the museum complex, was abandoned as 
well.  
The “Take Back the Memorial” movement illustrates the important role the public 
had in shaping the narrative of 9/11 that would be represented in the memorial site. While 
the memorial process was ostensibly controlled by national, state, and local authorities, 
the debates over the IFC demonstrate that the state was not the only actor that shaped 
collective memory during the commemorative process. As a nexus of both cultural and 
personal memory, the process of memorialization at Ground Zero revealed the essential 
role collective remembering played in constructing meaning and fostering healing in the 
wake of 9/11. Additionally, the rejection of the IFC ensured that the national narrative of 
the attacks, predicated on notions of American innocence and ideological superiority, 
would be preserved for future generations.  
 
The 9/11 Memorial Museum  
After the IFC and Drawing Center projects were abandoned, plans for the 9/11 
Museum evolved and grew into a much larger component of the memorial. The space 
dedicated to preserving and teaching the memory of 9/11 expanded to 110,000 square 
feet, most of which would be submerged underground. As the scope of the 9/11 Museum 
grew, so too did the efforts of preservations, survivors, and historians who fought to 
ensure that archeological remnants and artifacts from 9/11 would be saved and shared for 
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future generations. The process of 9/11 preservation was unique. Traditionally, objects 
are not considered for the National Register of Historic Places until 50 years after they 
achieve historical significance.239 By contrast, the World Trade Center site, including 
many of the artifacts from the attacks and the cleanup initiative, became eligible in 
February 2004. The National Register of Historic Places labeled Ground Zero as 
“exceptionally significant in the history of the United States as the location of events that 
immediately and profoundly influenced the lives of millions of American citizens.”240  
The main purpose of the 9/11 museum, like any historical museum, was to first 
preserve history and then teach it to later generations. Museums, and the past they 
present, are essential for maintaining continuity in the collective memory and identity 
between generations. Yet preserving the memory of 9/11 in a museum was 
extraordinarily difficult, not because of a lack of archival material but because of the 
overwhelming abundance of it. Museum directors had to consolidate an incredible 
amount of information into a coherent narrative, all the while being conscious of the 
concerns of family members. In this section, I will examine how the 9/11 Museum 
reinforced preexisting forms of collective memory in the creation of its exhibits and 
privileged the contributions of family members. In particular, I will focus on how the 
exhibits personalized collective memory by telling the individual stories of victims and 
survivors and providing a space for visitors to contribute their own memories.  
Originally conceived as a part of the larger cultural complex, the design for the 
museum shifted as plans for the memorial adapted to public opinion. Eventually, it was 
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decided that the Norwegian firm Snøhetta, which won the competition to design the 
cultural center in 2005, would create an entry pavilion that would lead to an underground 
museum designed by Davis Brody Bond Aedas. The final version of the museum did not 
look into the voids, display the names of the dead, and was not as integrated into the 
memorial as the planners originally intended.241 Yet many powerful components of 
Aedas’s design remained: the descending ramp that leads visitors down seven stories, the 
gigantic sunken cubes of the memorial pool basins, and the exposed slurry wall that kept 
the city from flooding after the towers collapsed.242 The interior design of the museum 
was intended to visually illustrate popular metaphors that had emerged in the days and 
months after September 11th. Each element of the museum’s design was intended to 
communicate the themes of darkness and light, wounding and healing, death and 
rebirth.243 These themes extended into the exhibits themselves, which are divided into 
two sections: one dedicated to commemorating those killed on 9/11 and in the 1993 WTC 
bombing, and the second dedicated to depicting the events prior, on, and after September 
11th.   
 When completed in 2011, the museum had four core exhibitions. The first, 
“Historical Exhibition: September 11, 2001,” presents the story of 9/11 using artifacts, 
images, first-person testimony, and archival audio and video recordings.244 Within this 
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exhibit are three parts: the Events of the Day, as they unfolded; Before 9/11, which 
provides the historical context leading up to the attacks; and After 9/11, which addresses 
the immediate aftermath and ongoing repercussions of the terrorist attacks.245 The second 
exhibit, “Memorial Exhibition: In Memoriam,” honors the 2,977 individuals killed as a 
result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the six individuals killed in the 
terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993.246 The third exhibit, 
“Rebirth at Ground Zero,” is a media installation that displays the physical 
transformation and renewal at the World Trade Center site alongside personal stories of 
individuals who were directly affected by 9/11.247 The fourth and final exhibit, 
“Reflecting on 9/11,” allows visitors to record their own stories, memories, and opinions 
about 9/11 and the day’s ongoing ramifications.248 Each of the exhibits illustrate how the 
museum aimed to communicate the historical and cultural memory of 9/11 to a broad 
audience.  
  In the first exhibit, salvaged and donated artifacts embody the historical events of 
the day while also serving as emotional ques that draw viewers into a larger narrative 
about the attacks. One item in the collection, the famous “Red Bandana” belonging to 
Wells Remy Crowther, captures within it many of the memories, emotions, and 
implications of 9/11. Welles Crowther, a 24-year-old equities trader working in the South 
Tower, was credited with helping at least ten people escape the South Tower before he 
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was killed in the collapse.249 As smoke filled the building, he wore a red bandana as a 
protective mask and continued to make trips into the building even as thousands tried to 
escape. Welles Crowther and his red bandana came to symbolize the remarkable heroism, 
unity, and courage of the American people on 9/11. The memory of Welles Crowther, 
often called “the man in the red bandana,” has often been use in presidential and 
anniversary speeches honoring 9/11. In fact, his story was one told by President Barack 
Obama at the 2014 dedication ceremony for the National September 11 Memorial & 
Museum. In additional to speeches, Welles Crowther has appeared as the subject of a 
documentary, Man in Red Bandana (2017), and the New York Times bestseller The Red 
Bandana by Tom Rinaldi. By including the red bandana as an artifact in the museum, 
curators were able to evocatively capture collective memories of the attacks and the way 
those memories were used to construct a national narrative post-9/11.  
In addition to artifacts in the historical exhibit, there is a large collection of 
personal photos and memorabilia in memorial exhibition.250 With the “In Memoriam” 
exhibit, curators had to figure out a way to portray expressions of grief in a way that did 
not appear obviously contrived. In the end, they decided to display photographs, stories, 
and mementos donated by family members. These individual expressions of grief became 
artifacts, carefully categorized, labeled and laid out in exhibits. A review of the museum 
published in the Art & Design section of The New York Times, described the feeling these 
objects engendered,  
 
249 Corey Kilgannon, “Saved on 9/11, by the Man in the Red Bandanna,” The New York Times, September 
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“For some reason, the largest objects — an intact fire truck with carefully 
folded hoses but a burned-out cab; a steel column plastered with prayer 
cards; a storefront jeans display still covered with World Trade Center 
ashes — are the easiest to take, maybe because of their public identity, or 
even their resemblance to contemporary sculpture. The hundreds of small, 
battered personal items, many donated by families of the victims, are 
another story. Their natural realm is the purse, the pocket, the bedside 
drawer at home; they feel too ordinary and intimate to have ended up 
under plexiglass. Infused with lost life, they make the experience of 
moving through this museum at once theatrical, voyeuristic and 
devotional.”251 
 
The purpose of the memorial exhibit, illustrated through the objects on display, is to 
“[reflect] the interests and activities of the victims before their lives were cut short.”252 
These simple, ordinary mementos are meant to symbolize the randomness of the attacks 
and its victims. The objects, whether a purse or a bandana, remind viewers of why the 
acts of terror on September 11th struck the nation so deeply. It was because those who 
died were innocent, average Americans who were merely going about their daily lives on 
a beautiful September day in New York.  
 While many lauded the museum for their personalization of a collective tragedy, 
the exhibit was not without controversy.  For example, one of the items on display as of 
May 2020 is a giraffe figurine that once belonged to Lenard Anthony White. The label 
for the figure describes how Leonard White was a man who cherished going to the opera, 
exploring art galleries, attending Broadway shows, and collecting giraffe figurines. While 
the figurine does symbolize the life of Leonard White, it seems more suited to a personal 
memorial than a national museum. Critics of the museum have argued that curators 
privileged private memory and individual experience over national considerations and the 
 
251 Cotter, “The 9/11 Story Told at Bedrock, Powerful as a Punch to the Gut.” 
252 “In Memoriam | National September 11 Memorial & Museum,” National September 11 Memorial & 
Museum, accessed May 9, 2020, https://www.911memorial.org/visit/museum/exhibitions/in-memoriam. 
 99 
need for a collective history of 9/11.  A critic for the New York Times, Edward 
Rothstein, wrote that out of the people who died during the attacks “the vast number have 
no claim on public attention other than our sympathy. They deserve memorialization 
within the context of the largest attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor.” 
Furthermore, Rothstein faults the museum with become too “preoccupied with the 
private, not the public.”  Rothstein’s remarks express the fears of held by some 
Americans that the memorial process, and the museum in particular, had allowed the 
victim’s families to much control over the direction of the site.253 Advocates for the 
museum, of course, strongly disagree with Rothstein’s argument. One family member, 
Anthony Gardner, told a writer, “the best things about the memorial and museum stem 
from the families’ engagement. That’s what is going to resonate with the visitors and 
that’s what they are going to remember… We weren’t just in it for the sake of our own 
loss, but for the sake of history.”254 Regardless on which side of argument readers fall on, 
this exhibit reflects the important role families played in shaping the construction of the 
museum. Furthermore, by placing the focus on lives lived rather than lives lost, the 
museum embodied post-9/11 narratives focusing on renewal.  
While the third exhibit echoes the themes of the first two, the fourth exhibit, 
“Reflecting on 9/11,” is an innovative and beautiful capstone to the museum and the 
overall memorial site that illustrates how memory can become history and vice versa. In 
this exhibit, visitors are invited to leave an “inscription,” either a note of remembrance, 
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sympathy, or recollection from that day.255 The notes are then projected on a screen 
below the slurry wall and added to the 9/11 Memorial & Museum digital archive.256 
Sarah Senk, author of “The Memory Exchange: Public Mourning at the National 9/11 
Memorial Museum,” recorded one phrase she observed while visiting the museum: “I 
wasn’t there but I still remember.”257 The note was written as part of a series of messages 
left by a group of nine- and ten-year-old’s visiting the museum as part of an elementary 
school trip.258 This note, one of many in the constantly growing archive, demonstrates the 
way interacting with a museum’s exhibits is a way for new generations to learn about and 
personalize 9/11 collective memory. Furthermore, the exhibit shows that commemoration 
of 9/11 is perpetually in progress and not fixed despite the creation of the memorial and 
museum.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
Contestations over the future of the former WTC site questioned the role and 
purpose of a 9/11 memorial. Some wanted to completely rebuild, while others felt that the 
emptiness of the tower foundations should remain pure and unbroken by a clutter of 
office buildings, a constant reminder of the collective trauma imbued in that sacred 
ground. From the beginning, many different stakeholders competed to shape the design 
and purpose of the memorial. At the eye of the storm was the state, balancing a civic need 
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to memorialize the dead and a political need to renew the city and set it on the path of 
economic recovery. While the state played an important role, representatives from the 
families’ of 9/11 victims were the core actors shaping the memorial process through 
protests and petitions. Family members relied on the moral authority of their personal 
trauma to claim ownership of the dead and decide what and how collective memories of 
9/11 deserved to be commemorated. The debate over memory ownership continues to 
play an important role as the attacks fade to history and the nation begins to move on. Yet 
even as 9/11 moves out of contemporary memory and into history, the interactive design 
of the 9/11 Memorial and Museum demonstrates the way meaning is constantly being 
negotiated and renegotiated.   
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 As visitors descend into the hallowed ground where the twin towers once stood, 
there is enormous art installation titled “Trying to Remember the Color of the Sky on 
That September Morning.” Inscribed in the center of the work, at the focal point between 
the two main exhibitions at the bedrock of the museum, is a quote by Virgil, “No day 
shall erase you from the memory of time.”259 The artwork, created in 2014 by Spencer 
Finch, contains 2,983 watercolor squares, each in their own shade of blue to represent a 
different victim of the September 11th terrorist attack.260 The art installation was designed 
to represent the idea of a collective 9/11 memory; that although “our own perception of 
the color blue might not be the same as that of another person…just like our perception of 
color, our memories share a common point of reference.”261  
Throughout this thesis, I analyzed the ways collective memory emerged and was 
established in the days, months, and years after the attacks. I looked at how the media 
created and operated within the dominant narrative of 9/11 by emphasizing the 
significance of the attacks, enabling the collective traumatization of Americans on 
September 11th; promulgating pro-war rhetoric; and underscoring the sense of national 
unity that emerged immediately after the attacks. I examined how presidents over the 
years have shaped and utilized collective memory, focusing on how presidents have 
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traditionally promoted stories of heroism, unity, and American exceptionalism as the 
main discursive representations of 9/11 memory. Although, in this chapter, I also 
discussed how President Trump has challenged Bush and Obama’s portrayal of 9/11 and 
has created new narratives around the attacks to legitimize his anti-Muslim, anti-
immigration, “America-first” rhetoric. Lastly, I assessed the role of public debates in the 
commemoration process at Ground Zero, observing how deliberation between state 
officials, designers, family members of 9/11 victims, and members of the broader 
community served as an avenue for collective remembering. I ended by looking at the 
ways the National 9/11 Memorial and Museum works to personalize collective memory 
and engage visitors in a perpetual process of commemoration. In total, the arguments 
made in each chapter demonstrate the ways 9/11 collective memory developed, but also 
produce questions as to the role that memory will play as the events of September 11th, 
2001, fade into history.  
On April 6, 2020, the Atlantic published the article, “The 9/11 Era is Over: The 
Coronavirus Pandemic and a Chapter of History that Should Have Expired Long Ago.” In 
the article, Ben Rhodes, former deputy national security adviser to Barack Obama, argues 
that the era of policymaking predicated on the memory of 9/11 must come to an end. On 
the one hand, he argues that the sentiment “Every day is September 12th” still holds a 
significant about of power in state and military circles. Under Trump, the United States 
has pursued a policy of brinksmanship with Iran, which has included withdrawing from 
the Iran Nuclear Deal, renewing sanctions, deploying an additional 20,000 U.S. troops to 
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the Middle East, and assassinating General Qasem Soleimani.262 In fact, the assassination 
of Soleimani increased tensions between the United States an Iran to the point that war 
was not out of the question only four months ago.263 However, even as the state remains 
tangled up in wars in the Middle East, much of the public, especially the younger 
generations, no longer view terrorism as the most pressing issue of the country.264  
The discrepancy between the national security concerns of the administration and 
the public have come to a head during the coronavirus pandemic. On April 7, 2020, 
Governor Andrew Cuomo announced that number of people who have died from the 
novel coronavirus in New York has surpassed the number killed as a result of the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001. The number grows exponentially higher given that New 
York has more cases than any other country in the world.265  However, invocations of the 
past go far beyond comparing numbers of the dead. In an article for CNN, Ray Sanchez 
describes the parallels between the unprecedent disruptions caused by the terrorist attacks 
and by the pandemic. Sanchez quotes Governor Cuomo, who made a direct allusion to 
9/11 in a recent press briefing on the coronavirus; "For me, in New York, it reminds me 
of 9/11, where one moment, which was inconceivable, just changed everything, changed 
your perspective on the world, changed your perspective on safety.”266 The main 
 
262 Ben Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era Is Over: The Coronavirus Pandemic and a Chapter of History That Should 
Have Expired Long Ago,” The Atlantic, April 6, 2020, sec. Ideas, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/its-not-september-12-anymore/609502/. 
263 Ibid.  
264 Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era Is Over: The Coronavirus Pandemic and a Chapter of History That Should Have 
Expired Long Ago.” 
265 Martin Johnson, “More New Yorkers Have Died from Coronavirus This Week than on 9/11,” TheHill, 
April 10, 2020, https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/492223-more-new-yorkers-died-from-covid-19-
this-week-than-in-9-11-attacks. 
266 Ray Sanchez, “Echoes of 9/11, as New Yorkers ‘Try to Keep Calm but We Can’t Quite Carry On,’” 
CNN, March 22, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/22/us/new-york-coronavirus-crisis-911/index.html. 
 105 
difference between the two events, argues Sanchez, is that people are seen as a potential 
source of contagion, not comfort.267 As a result, unity during this public health crisis falls 
fall behind the national unity seen after 9/11.  
The case of the coronavirus pandemic demonstrates that even as time passes, 
people continue to draw upon 9/11 memory in order to contextualize new events and 
crises. When dealing with an unprecedent national health crisis, politicians can use 
allusions to powerful collective memories, such as 9/11, to fit incomprehensible events 
into preexisting narratives. Thus, analyzing how collective memory of 9/11 developed in 
the wake of the attacks can help readers understand the symbolic meaning of 9/11 and 
what it represents when used as a discursive device.   
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Chapter Three Appendix 
Figure 1: George W. Bush’s Job Approval Ratings Trend 2001-2009268 
 
Figure 2: Voting by Party in the House of Representatives on H.J.Res. 64 (Authorization 
for Use of Military Force)269 
 
 Total Votes (%) Republicans Democrats Independents 
Yea 100% 214 204 2 
Nay 0% 0 1 0 
Not Voting N/A 5 5 0 
 
Figure 3: Voting by Party in the House of Representatives on H.J.Res. 114 
(Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq)270 
 
 Total Votes (%) Republicans Democrats Independents 
Yea 69% 215 81 0 
Nay 31% 6 126 1 
Not Voting  N/A 2 1 0 
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Figure 5: Cover of The New Yorker, titled “Politics of Fear,” from July 21st, 2008. The 
cover portrays Barack Obama as a Muslim terrorist and Michelle Obama as a figure 
resembling the Black Panthers271  
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Chapter Four Appendix 
Figure 1: The hierarchy of local, state, and federal officials in charge of the 
commemoration process at Ground Zero.272 
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Figure 2: Arial View of the 9/11 Memorial depicting the footprints of the former twin 
towers.273 
 
 
Figure 3: Photos of the Dead in the “In Memoriam” Exhibit274 
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Chapter Five Appendix  
Figure 1: “Trying to Remember the Color of the Sky on That September Morning,” 
created in 2014 by Spencer Finch. It contains 2,983 watercolor squares, each in their own 
shade of blue to represent a different victim of the September 11th terrorist attack.275 
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